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Law and Inequality
Introduction
Victims are empowered.., by their alliance with criminal jus-
tice agencies. Threatened sanctions for continuing abuse,
whether made explicitly by victims or implicitly by the atten-
tion of the state, are made credible by the state's willingness to
exercise its power .... As long as the alliance holds . . . [a
victim] should find protection ... [b]ut the alliance must also be
potent.1
In the wake of growing public awareness of violence within
family structures2 and the justice system's ineffectiveness in deal-
ing with the needs of victims, 3 a number of progressive legal re-
1. David A. Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, The Preventative Impact of Policies for
Prosecuting Wife Batterers, in DoMEsTIc VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE RESPONSE 181, 204 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1992) (reporting on
the effectiveness of various prosecutorial responses to domestic abuse and sug-
gesting that the key to preventing future violence against a woman/victim is not
prosecution, but the existence of a strong victim-system alliance).
2. Recently domestic violence has received unprecedented publicity in Minne-
sota, largely because of a number of cases involving "celebrity batterers" such as
football great O.J. Simpson, Minnesota Vikings football quarterback Warren Moon
and Minnesota Senator Kevin Chandler. See Kay Harvey & Jim Ragsdale, Big
Names Put Domestic Abuse in Less Forgiving Light, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, July
29, 1995, at Al (commenting that "not long ago similar incidents would have been
shoved into the family closet when victims refused to press charges," but now, be-
cause of a "new community standard" and a "shrinking tolerance for domestic
abuse," such incidents are becoming "everybody's business").
Publicity is often recognized as a remedy for societal ills. See, e.g., Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (quoting L. BRAuDEIs, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (Na-
tional Home Library Foundation ed., 1933)). "Sunlight is said to be the best of disin-
fectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." Id. Although increasing
attention and public denouncement of domestic abuse is a step toward change, one
should not infer that great strides have been made in stopping domestic abuse or
eliminating its causes.
In fact, we have only recently begun to assess the pervasive effects of domestic
abuse. In the United States, three to four million women are beaten in their homes
each year by their husbands or partners. MINNESOTA COALrrON FOR BATTERED Wo-
MEN ET AL., ARTS ACTION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE FACTS (1992) [hereinaf-
ter ARTS ACTION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE]. Thirty-four percent of female
homicide victims aged 15 years or older are killed by their husbands, ex-husbands or
boyfriends. Id. Employers lose millions annually to turnover, absenteeism and ex-
cessive use of medical benefits because of domestic abuse. Family Life as a Work-
place Issue: Twin Cities Companies Work to Prevent Domestic Abuse and Violence,
WORKING WoMAN, Jan. 1991, at 6. At least 25% of workplace performance problems
are a result of conflicts at home. Id. In 1993, the American Medical Association
announced that violence had reached "epidemic proportions" and called on doctors to
examine patients routinely for abuse. Sarah Glazer, Violence Against Women, CONG.
Q. RESEARCHER, Feb. 26, 1993, at 171. See also Violence Against Women is Now
Grounds for Asylum, STAR Tam. (Minneapolis), May 27, 1995, at A4 (announcing the
Immigration and Naturalization Service's new guidelines formally recognizing rape,
domestic abuse and other forms of violence against women as potential grounds for
political asylum).
3. Headlines and accounts of vicious and sometimes fatal violent acts commit-
ted against family members and the criminal justice system's failure to intervene
served as an impetus for the "spreading network" of shelters designed to assist vic-
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forms have emerged.4 These reforms include warrantless arrests
(pro-arrest policies),5 anti-stalking laws,6 prosecutions without vic-
tims of "wife battering." Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Introduction, in DoMES-
TIC VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE, supra note 1, at vii. This
network of advocates began to recognize and articulate the existence of a "profoundly
unresponsive criminal justice system" in which "the police and courts extended,
often deliberately, only the scantest attention to the needs of such victims." Id. See
also Blake Morrison, Hennepin County to Open New and Improved Domestic Abuse
Victim Service Center in Fall, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, June 28, 1994, at C5.
[Diomestic abuse arrests by Minneapolis police appear to be increasing,
from about 3,000 in the first 11 months of 1990 to 3,646 in the same
period in 1993. Given the current system.., about half of the victims
aren't likely to have the strength or desire to push forward with the
prosecution of their abusers.
Id.
This Note uses the term "domestic abuse victim" rather than "battered woman"
wherever possible in recognition of Elizabeth Schneider's observation that the term
"battered woman" focuses on the woman, as opposed to the perpetrator of the harm
caused. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Femi-
nist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 520, 530
(1992). Because the overwhelming majority of victims of domestic violence are wo-
men, this Note will also use the terms "victim," "woman," "petitioner," or "she" inter-
changeably when referring to abuse victims. See Developments in the Law: Legal
Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1501 n.1 (1993) [hereinafter
Developments] (acknowledging that while victims and perpetrators of domestic vio-
lence do not always divide along gender lines, batterers tend to be male and victims
tend to be female in the vast majority of cases). Similarly, this Note will use "respon-
dent," "he," or batterer" when referring to alleged abusers. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE: THE DATA 21 (1983) (citing
statistics that men commit 95% of all assaults on partners or ex-partners).
4. See Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 3, at xi (discussing the public and polit-
ical pressures that led to "wholesale changes" in how state statutes addressed do-
mestic violence). The minimal responses of societal institutions to advocates'
demands to do more to protect women led to the "uncovering and publicizing of major
attitudinal and structural impediments to performance." Id. at vii. As a result, fem-
inists began to "discern a clear, if perhaps unconscious, pattern by which the crimi-
nal justice system ignored crimes committed against women" and to rally themselves
to combat it. Id. at vii-viii. Pressure mounted, and from the late 1970s through the
1980s, feminists pushed to change the criminal justice system's policies of interven-
tion and interaction with family violence. Id. at viii. Accordingly, successive move-
ments have advocated different structural and procedural approaches for deterring,
stopping and punishing domestic violence. Id.
See generally Angela Corsilles, No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic
Violence Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63 FoRDHAM L. REV.
853, 854 (1994) (referring to the 'veritable explosion" in the number of laws enacted
since the 1970s to combat the problem of domestic abuse); Developments, supra note
3, at 1528-51 (explaining and evaluating recent state and federal responses to do-
mestic violence); Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection
for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 801 (1993) (providing a summary of state initiatives for combating domestic
abuse).
5. See generally J. David Hirschel & Ira Hutchinson, Police-Preferred Arrest
Policies, in WOMAN BATTERING: POLICY RESPONSES 49 (Michael Steinman ed., 1991);
Evan Stark, Mandatory Arrest of Batterers: A Reply to Its Critics, 36 Am. BEHAv-




tim cooperation,7 and modified orders for protection (mutual and ex
parte).8 Although some praise such reforms for providing commit-
ted justice personnel with creative tools to aggressively pursue bat-
terers,9  others criticize the reforms for failing to address
obstructionist attitudes and operational practicesO that lead to the
uneven and uncoordinated implementation of current laws." As a
result, a number of progressive reforms have stalled in practice
even though they seemed promising on the books.12
One such promising yet troubling reform is Chapter 142,13 a
controversial 1995 amendment to Minnesota's Domestic Abuse
Act.14 Chapter 142 allows victims of immediate and threatened vi-
6. See generally Cassandra Ward, Minnesota's Anti-Stalking Statute: A Durable
Tool to Protect Victims from Terroristic Behavior, 12 LAw & INEQ. J. 613 (1994); Su-
san E. Bernstein, Living Under Seige: Do Stalking Laws Protect Domestic Violence
Victims?, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 525 (1993); Wayne E. Bradburn, Jr., Stalking Statutes:
An Ineffective Legislative Remedy for Rectifying Perceived Problems with Today's In-
junction System, 19 Omo N.U. L. REv. 271 (1992); Richard A. Lingg, Stopping Stalk-
ers: A Critical Examination of Anti-Stalking Statutes, 67 ST. JOHN's L. Rv. 347
(1993); Robert P. Faulkner & Douglas H. Hsiao, And Where You Go I'll Follow: The
Constitutionality of Antistalking Laws and Proposed Model Legislation, 31 HARv. J.
ON LEGIS. 1 (1994).
7. See generally Naomi R. Cahn & Lisa G. Lerman, Prosecuting Woman Abuse,
in WOMAN BATTERING: PoLcy RESPONSES, supra note 5, at 95; Developments, supra
note 3, at 1540-41; Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Bat-
tering: Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV. 267,
321-27 (1985).
8. See generally Elizabeth Topliffe, Why Civil Protection Orders Are Effective
Remedies for Domestic Violence But Mutual Protective Orders Are Not, 67 IND. L.J.
1039 (1992); Klein & Orloff, supra note 4, at 1031-43, 1074-77; Kit Kinports & Karla
Fischer, Orders of Protection in Domestic Violence Cases: An Empirical Assessment of
the Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 163 (1993); Dorothy Carl
Quinn, Ex Parte Protection Orders: Is Due Process Locked Out?, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 843
(1985).
9. See Corsilles, supra note 4, at 855 (proclaiming that despite the "criminal
justice system's continued ineffectiveness... committed police commissioners, dis-
trict attorneys, and attorneys general have seized the tools provided to them by their
respective legislatures to vigorously enforce domestic violence laws").
10. Id. ('[Alithough legislative enactments have removed many structural im-
pediments to prosecuting batterers, operational practices remain unchanged.");
Kinports & Fischer, supra note 8, at 165 (asserting that apparently progressive do-
mestic violence laws fail because they are reshaped to "reflect longstanding cultural
attitudes that demean, discredit, and subordinate women").
11. E.g., Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 3, at viii ("Responses are uneven and
uncoordinated among jurisdictions, even within municipalities, among the police,
the prosecutors, and the courts.").
12. See, e.g., Lynne Henderson, Getting to Know: Honoring Women in Law and
Fact, 2 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 41 (1993) (asserting that societal norms are a major
reason for the failure of seemingly progressive rape statutes); Kinports & Fischer,
supra note 8, at 165 (expanding Henderson's assertion to apply to provisions in do-
mestic violence reform legislation governing protection orders).
13. Domestic Abuse Act, ch. 142, sec. 5, § 7(c), 1995 Minn. Laws 258, 260 (codi-
fied as amended at MIN. STAT. § 518B.01). See infra Appendix A.
14. MNmN. STAT. § 518B.01 (1994).
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olence to obtain a one-step, self-finalizing ex parte protection order.
The reform replaces the previous two-step, temporary ex parte pro-
tection order which did not become a final remedy until after a
mandatory hearing.15 Although heralded by proponents as a
means for increasing victim access to ex parte relief,16 Chapter
142's critics have expressed concern that the amended protection
order will cause new, unanticipated problems and may even be
unconstitutional. 17
The controversy generated by innovative domestic abuse re-
forms leads one to question just what impact problematic reforms
have on women already victimized by violence. In other words,
what is the effect of reforms that are neither credible (because the
state is unwilling to fully use them) nor potent (because they are
ultimately ineffective)? This Note seeks to explore these issues by
examining them in the context of Chapter 142.
Part I of this Note provides background on the significance of,
and apprehensions related to, the use of ex parte protection orders
to combat domestic abuse. Part II spells out the changes Chapter
142 makes in ex parte protection order relief and discusses courts'
and domestic abuse advocates' concerns about the amendment.
Part III evaluates the merits of these concerns. Part IV argues that
the modified ex parte protection order created by Chapter 142,
although well-intentioned and in many respects beneficial to abuse
victims, is a flawed remedy that is unlikely to have any real impact
on domestic violence against women. Part V concludes, however,
that with some modification Chapter 142 can be shaped into a more
15. See MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(7) (1994) (containing the unmodified text of the
previous temporary ex parte order). See generally Kinports & Fischer, supra note 8,
at 165-66 (explaining the two-step process typically used in temporary or emergency
ex parte protection orders); Quinn, supra note 9, at 846-47 (discussing the origin and
characteristics of temporary ex parte relief).
Prior to Chapter 142, victims confronting situations of immediate and
threatened violence could obtain only temporary ex parte orders that expired after
two weeks if not renewed at a "final" or full hearing. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(7Xa), (e)
(1994), amended by ch. 142, sec. 5, § 7(a), (e) (Supp. 1995). Chapter 142 changes this
by providing that "[ilf neither the petitioner [n]or the respondent requests a hearing,
then the ex parte order for protection becomes the final order." BATTERED WOMEN'S
LEGAL ADVOCACY PRoJEcT, SouTHERN MINNEsoTA REGIONAL LEGAL SERVICES, INC.,
ORDERS FOR PROTECTION WrouT HEARINGS: SuMMARY AND TnPs 1 (July 13, 1995)
[hereinafter SUMMARY AND Tnps] (on file with author). The mandatory hearing provi-
sion, therefore, is discretionary. A petitioner's initial order for protection becomes
the final order for protection and is valid for up to one year without any need for a
hearing. Id.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 36-48, 69-74 (discussing perceived bene-
fits of Chapter 142).




meaningful tool that better enables victim/survivors to leave violent
situations.
1. Ex Parte Protection Orders
A Origin and Purpose
A civil protection order (hereinafter protection order) is a bind-
ing court mandate prohibiting an abuser from committing further
acts of violence against his victim. 18 Although a protection order's
effectiveness is limited, 19 it does offer a domestic violence victim an
alternative and supplement to the more severe and stigmatic op-
tions of criminal prosecution or divorce. 20 In addition to ordering a
batterer to stop his violent conduct, a protection order often re-
quires him to vacate a shared residence,21 thus providing a victim
with a means for immediate physical separation from her abuser.22
An ex parte motion is a request made to the court by one party
to an action in the absence, and often without the knowledge, of the
other party.23 An ex parte protection order, therefore, grants a do-
mestic violence victim relief without providing her abuser with no-
18. PETER FINN & SARAH COLSON, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, ISSUES &
PRACTICES, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS: LEGISLATION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND
ENFORCEMENT (1990); see also Peter Finn, Statutory Authority in the Use and En-
forcement of Civil Protection Orders Against Domestic Abuse, 23 FAM. L.Q. 43 (1989)
(hereinafter Finn, Statutory Authority] (reviewing civil protection order legislation).
"These orders may provide further protection by evicting the batterer from a shared
residence, arranging for temporary custody of children, limiting child visitation
rights, requiring payment of child support, and ordering the batterer to attend
mandatory counseling." Id.
19. Finn, Statutory Authority, supra note 18, at 45 (listing criticisms of ex parte
orders including susceptibility to fraud, reinforcement of a "soft" approach to serious
crime, and widespread lack of enforcement); see also infra notes 84-86 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the perception of orders as "worthless pieces of paper").
20. Finn, Statutory Authority, supra note 18, at 45; see also Quinn, supra note 8,
at 846 ("Civil protection orders ... avoid the need to rely on socially stigmatizing
criminal sanctions."); see infra notes 89, 184-86, 192 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the importance of the victim-system alliance as a means for empowering
victims).
21. Quinn, supra note 8, at 847; see Gretchen P. Mullins, The Battered Woman
and Homelessness, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 237, 247-48 (1994) (arguing that evicting the
abuser is the only fair solution because any other response further victimizes the
woman by forcing her to flee her home when she has committed no crime).
22. Quinn, supra note 8, at 846.
23. Nadine Taub, Ex Parte Proceedings in Domestic Violence Situations: Alterna-
tive Frameworks for Constitutional Scrutiny, 9 HoFsTRA L. REv. 95, 99 (1980). See
also BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 517 (5th ed. 1979) (defining ex parte as "a judicial
proceeding, order, injunction, etc .... taken at the instance and for the benefit of one
party only, and without notice to or contestation by, any person adversely
interested").
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tice or a hearing.24 An ex parte protection order is important
because it facilitates a victim's immediate safety by not delaying
protection until her alleged abuser is notified and a hearing is held
to validate the order.25
B. Ex Parte Protection Orders Before Chapter 142
Prior to the promulgation of Chapter 142, a court could issue
an ex parte protection order only if the petitioning victim alleged
immediate and present danger of domestic abuse26 and provided a
sworn and factually specific affidavit.2 7 The resulting order was
temporary in nature, and renewable only following a mandatory
hearing held no more than seven days after the order's issuance.
28
Notice outlining the conditions and consequences of the order was
served on the alleged abuser either in person,2 9 by mail or by publi-
cation.3 0 If the respondent did not appear at the scheduled,
24. Quinn, supra note 8, at 847; see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(7)(a)(1)-(2); see
infra Appendix A.
Ex parte protection orders are themselves the product of legislative reforms
designed to address some of the "clarity" problems generally associated with protec-
tion orders. Finn, Statutory Authority, supra note 18, at 45-46. These problems in-
clude a lack of clarity regarding the scope of protection orders, the kinds of relief
available, and the types of victims and offenses eligible for protective relief. Id. One
approach for resolving these problems was to develop more numerous and clearly-
defined statutory tools. Id. at 46. Ex parte protection orders developed as a result of
this proliferation of distinct procedural tools. See id. See generally Quinn, supra
note 8, at 846 (addressing the origins of civil protection orders generally and ex parte
orders specifically).
25. Peter Finn, Civil Protection Orders: A Flawed Opportunity for Intervention,
in WoMAN BATTERING: POLICY RESPONSES, supra note 5, at 155, 171.
26. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(7Xa) (1994), amended by ch. 142, sec. 5, § 7(a) (Supp.
1995); see also Baker v. Baker, 494 N.W.2d 282,285 (Minn. 1992) (comparing the Act
to a "band-aid" because it was designed to curtail, only in the short term, the harm
one member of a household might be doing to another).
27. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(4)(b) (1994); see also Baker, 494 N.W.2d at 287 (citing
MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(4Xb)) ("[T]he petition must be 'accompanied by an affidavit
made under oath stating the specific facts and circumstances from which relief is
sought.' ").
28. MwN. STAT. § 518B.01(7Xc) (1994), amended by ch. 142, sec. 5, § 7(c). The
temporary order was valid for a fixed period which was not to exceed 14 days. Id.
The order automatically expired unless renewed at the mandatory hearing. Id.
§ 518B.01(7Xd).
29. Id. § 518B.01(8)(a) ("The petition and any order issued under this section
shall be served on the respondent personally.").
30. Id. § 518B.01(8Xc) ("If personal service cannot be made, the court may order
service ... by alternate means, or by publication... as in other actions.") (emphasis
added). Thus, where the petitioner properly applied for alternative service with the
court, the court could, where it deemed appropriate, order "service by first class mail,
forwarding address requested, to any addresses where there is a reasonable possibil-
ity that mail or information will be forwarded or communicated to the respondent."
Id. Similarly, service by publication was available where the court believed "it
might reasonably succeed in notifying the respondent of the proceeding." Id. The
terms of service by publication were defined as follows:
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mandatory hearing, the petitioner's protection order would usually
be renewed by default.3 1 If, however, the petitioner did not appear
for any reason, the protection order was usually dismissed.3 2
H. Chapter 142 and Its Impact
A The Impetus and Rationale for Change
The impetus for Chapter 142 was a letter sent by a family
court judge33 in outstate Minnesota to his elected official34 in the
Minnesota House of Representatives.35 In his letter the judge sug-
gested changes to the temporary ex parte protection order provision
as a way to conserve judicial resources and remedy two troubling
trends he observed relating to mandatory, ex parte protection order
hearings. 3 6
[Slervice may be made by one week published notice, as provided under
section 645.11, provided petitioner files with the court an affidavit stat-
ing that an attempt at personal service made by a sheriff was unsuc-
- cessful because the respondent is avoiding service by concealment or
otherwise, and that a copy of the petition and notice of hearing has been
mailed to the respondent at the respondent's residence or that the resi-
dence is not known to the petitioner. Service under this paragraph is
complete seven days after publication. The court shall set a new hear-
ing date if necessary to allow the respondent the five-day minimum no-
tice required under paragraph (a).
Id. § 518B.01(5Xb), amended by ch. 142, sec. 4, § 5(b) (Supp. 1995). Moreover, the
court could "require the petitioner to make telephone calls to appropriate persons."
Id. § 518B.01(8)(c). Service was "deemed complete" 21 days after mailing or after
court-ordered publication. Id.
31. Telephone Interview with the Honorable Judge Gerard Ring, Minnesota
State Court, Third Judicial District, Olmstead County (Oct. 13, 1995) (noting that of
the nearly 90 counties in Minnesota, Hennepin County was the only one to issue
arrest warrants for respondents who failed to appear at the mandatory hearing).
32. Id.
33. Judge Gerard Ring is a member of the state court bench for the Third Judi-
cial District. Judge Ring developed the idea for the amendment and sought feedback
and initial support from the women's advocacy agency in his local community of
Rochester, Minnesota. Telephone Interview with Jody Tharp, Facilities Manager,
Rochester Women's Shelter, Inc. (Feb. 23, 1996).
34. Representative David Bishop is the State Representative for the Third Judi-
cial District.
35. Hearings on H.F. 927 Before the House Judiciary Comm., 79th Sess. (Mar.
31, 1995) [hereinafter Hearings] (statements of Representative David Bishop) (avail-
able on tape at the Minnesota Legislative Library, Tape 5). Chapter 142 began as a
bill introduced by State Representative Bishop in March 1995. Telephone Interview
with Representative David Bishop, Minnesota House of Representatives (Sept. 25,
1995). Olmstead County, the site of Judge Ring's court, is located in Representative
David Bishop's district.
36. Telephone Interview with Judge Gerard Ring, supra note 31; see also Hear-
ings, supra note 35.
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First, over half of the scheduled hearings went uncontested
and unattended by alleged abusers.37 These "non-hearings" con-
sumed valuable time and resources on an already overcrowded
court calendar.38 Given that hearings were mandatory and sched-
uled by the court, delay and administrative inefficiency were una-
voidable.3 9 Moreover, because petitioners were compelled to
appear,40 hearings without the alleged batterer in attendance
wasted not only the court's time, but also the victims'.
4
'
Second, some of the victims who appeared at the hearings
were unprepared for the procedure awaiting them. 42 Petitioners
would sometimes come to court uninformed and pro se, only to face
abusers who arrived with counsel and/or witnesses.43 These wo-
37. Telephone Interview with Judge Gerard Ring, supra note 31; see, e.g., Finn,
supra note 25, at 171 (noting it is "unusual for a batterer to request an emergency
hearing to oppose his eviction"). Judge Ring's experience seems borne out in other
jurisdictions. One example is Springfield, Illinois where "even with a court sum-
mons only one-third of all respondents show up at scheduled hearings for permanent
orders. Furthermore, when they do come, they generally admit to having assaulted
their wives or girlfriends (but claim that the beatings were not 'serious')." Id. Inter-
estingly, "[tihe reason [respondents] appear at all is usually to contest custody or
visitation provisions, not eviction." Id.
38. Telephone Interview with Representative David Bishop, supra note 35. The
term "non-hearing" was used to describe scheduled hearings at which one of the nec-
essary parties did not appear. Id.; see also Hearings, supra note 35. Representative
Bishop, the House sponsor of the bill, stated that the idea "came from Judge Ring
who was disturbed by how many times his court calendar for hearings was full of...
scheduled hearings at which nobody showed up." Telephone Interview with Repre-
sentative David Bishop, supra note 35.
39. Telephone Interview with Representative David Bishop, supra note 35; see
also Hearings, supra note 35.
40. If the petitioner failed to appear the order would be dismissed. Telephone
Interview with Judge Gerard Ring, supra note 31.
41. Id. See generally Judge Michael J. Voris, The Domestic Violence Civil Protec-
tion Order and the Role of the Court, 24 AKRON L. Rav. 423, 430 (1990) (identifying
the various hardships victims face by simply appearing in court).
42. Telephone Interview with Judge Gerard Ring, supra note 31; see, e.g.,
Metchel v. Metchel, 528 N.W.2d 916, 918 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (providing a vivid
example of the risks that exist when a petitioner appears pro se). See generally
Donna Halvorsen, Victim's Advocates Press Legislators for Help, STAR TRIB. (Minne-
apolis), Mar. 26, 1992, at BI (stating that 95% of those seeking protective orders are
women and most of these appear pro se).
43. Telephone Interview with Judge Gerard Ring, supra note 31; see Voris,
supra note 41, at 430 (observing that "[riarely is a victim schooled in pleading a case,
and she often recites the same statements that appear on the sworn affidavit before
the Judge or Referee"); cf id. (commenting that judges are placed in a "distinctly
unjudicial position... if one, or both are unrepresented").
Although they seldom are legal counsel, advocates can play a major role in miti-
gating this potential disparity. See Elena Salzman, The Quincy District Court Do-
mestic Violence Prevention Program: A Model Legal Framework for Domestic
Violence Intervention, 74 B.U. L. Rev. 329, 340-41 (1994) (asserting that the impor-
tance of volunteer "domestic abuse clerks" cannot be overestimated). Interestingly,
advocates did not seem to play a particularly prevalent role in Third Judicial District
hearings. Only in approximately one-tenth of the cases did domestic abuse advo-
1996]
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men would be caught '"lat-footed," possibly losing their protection
order as a result.44 In other instances, petitioners might invest
considerable time and money preparing their cases, only to find the
respondents failed to appear.4 5
Making hearings discretionary would ideally prevent victims
from having to come to court or face their abusers unnecessarily.46
Victims would not be forced to risk or worry about their safety or
their jobs,47 only to find their abusers never intended to appear at
the final hearing. Doing away with the automatic mandatory hear-
ing for obtaining an ex parte protection order, therefore, was seen
as a way to save already strained judicial resources and unneces-
sary petitioner hardship.48
A discretionary hearing policy was believed to take nothing
from alleged abusers because they would still have the right to a
hearing, only now they would have to request one.4 9 Moreover, all
interested parties would benefit because any hearings that occurred
would be "real hearings."50 Thus, the bill was introduced on the
theory that everyone would "win"-respondents would still have
the right to contest bad orders, petitioners would not have to en-
dure the hardship of facing their abusers unnecessarily, and courts
cates accompany petitioners to their ex parte protection order hearings. Telephone
Interview with Judge Gerard Ring, supra note 31.
44. Telephone Interview with Judge Gerard Ring, supra note 31. A continuance
was not viewed as an appropriate option for the unprepared petitioner because she
was required by law to be ready for the hearing. Id.; see also Voris, supra note 41, at
430 (noting that a victim representing herself may often appear "insincere and
inarticulate").
45. Telephone Interview with Judge Gerard Ring, supra note 31.
46. Id.; see also Hearings, supra note 35 (explaining that after Chapter 142,
hearings will not take place "just as a formality"); Voris, supra note 41, at 430
(describing the ex parte process and final hearing as "unnerving at best for the vic-
tim even if the bjludge or Irleferee is sensitive to the domestic violence issues").
47. See SUmmARY AND Tips, supra note 15, at 8 (due to Chapter 142 "women now
have a procedure that meets their needs better"); Telephone Interview with Maria
Pastoor, Staff Attorney, Battered Women's Legal Advocacy Project (Sept. 28, 1995)
(commenting that some women will lose their jobs if they take time off from work to
go to court hearings).
48. See Hearings, supra note 35 (noting that parties ordered to attend scheduled
hearings would often be "very angry" and concluding that "obviating the hearing"
would be useful to the parties as well as the court).
49. Telephone Interview with Representative David Bishop, supra note 35; see,
e.g., Domestic Abuse Act, ch. 142, sec. 5, § 7(c), 1995 Minn. Laws 259, 260 (providing
that the order served on a respondent "must include a notice advising the respon-
dent of the right to request a hearing," must be accompanied by 'a form that can be
used by the respondent to request a hearing and must include a conspicuous notice
that a hearing will not be held unless requested by the respondent within five days of
service of the order").
50. Telephone Interview with Representative David Bishop, supra note 35; see
also Hearings, supra note 35 (remarking that hearings occurring after the Act's
amendment would be more than a mere "formality in the statute").
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would save scarce administrative resources and better allocate pre-
cious court time to "real hearings."51
B. An Overview of Chapter 142
Enacted in August 1995, Chapter 14252 substantially altered
the existing terms of ex parte relief available in situations of imme-
diate and threatened violence. Although an ex parte protection or-
der remains available only on the sworn affidavit of the
petitioner,53 the order as initially issued is no longer clearly tempo-
rary in nature, 54 nor does it mandate a hearing to become a final
remedy.55 Instead, an ex parte protection order can be initially is-
sued for up to a year56 and, assuming proper service, 57 will not
lapse unless directly and successfully challenged by the alleged
abuser.58
Thus, although a hearing remains available to the alleged
abuser, that hearing is now discretionary in nature. If the peti-
tioner does not ask for a hearing, and the respondent does not re-
quest a hearing within five days of receiving personal service of the
order,59 the ex parte protection order automatically becomes a final
51. See Hearings, supra note 35.
52. See Domestic Abuse Act, ch. 142, sec. 5, § 7(c), 1995 Minn. Laws 258. The
amendment was signed by the governor on May 10, 1995, and went into effect three
months later in August 1995. Id.
53. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(7Xa) (1994), amended by ch. 142, sec. 5, § 7(a), 1995
Minn. Laws 258.
54. This is clearly demonstrated by the deletion of the word "temporary" in the
heading for subdivision 7, as well as throughout Chapter 142's text. See, e.g., Do-
mestic Abuse Act, ch. 142, sec. 5, § 7(a), 1995 Minn. Laws 258, 259.
55. The deletion of the conditional language "pending a full hearing" from subdi-
vision 7(a) indicates that a hearing is now discretionary. Id.; see also id. sec. 5, § 7(c)
(inserting the phrase "[ulpon request" to indicate that hearings are no longer
mandated).
56. Id. § 7(c) (providing that "an ex parte. . . order for protection shall be effec-
tive for a fixed period ... set by the court, as provided in subdivision 6 paragraph (b),
or until modified or vacated by the court"). MiNN. STAT. § 518B.01(6Xb) (1994)
(designating that "any relief granted by the order for protection shall be for a fixed
period not to exceed one year...').
57. See Domestic Abuse Act, ch. 142, sec. 5, § 7(d), 1995 Minn. Laws 258, 260 ("If
personal service is not made or the affidavit is not filed within 14 days of issuance of
the ex parte order, the order expires .... Unless personal service is completed, if
service by published notice is not completed within 28 days of issuance of the ex
parte order, the order expires").
58. See id. § 7(c) (detailing that "an ex parte order for protection shall be effec-
tive for a period ... set by the court... or until modified or vacated by the court
pursuant to a hearing"). The petitioner, of course, can also request a hearing when
requesting the ex parte protection order, however, "[ilf the petitioner does not re-
quest... Ia hearing, one] will not be held unless requested by the respondent within




remedy effective for up to a year.6 O Alternate service by publication
or mail is also possible where personal service proves
unsuccessful.61
C. The Response of Advocates and the Courts to Chapter
142
Domestic abuse advocates and attorneys were among the first
to voice concerns about Chapter 142.62 The local judiciary soon fol-
lowed. Less than two months after Chapter 142's adoption, Henne-
pin County's Family Court Division issued a standing "no use"
order barring the use of Chapter 142's revised ex parte protection
order.63
Advocates, even those with an active lobbying body, were ini-
tially caught off guard by the bill's introduction.6 4 The modifica-
tions proposed in Chapter 142 were simply not a priority on the
advocates' agenda. 65 Given the amendment's unique origin and its
introduction late in the legislative session,6 6 domestic abuse advo-
60. See supra note 56. The period of protection guaranteed by the ex parte pro-
tection order is a discretionary matter left to the presiding judge or referee at peti-
tioner's initial ex parte protection order hearing. Telephone Interview with Nancy
Libman, Supervisor, Ramsey County Domestic Abuse Intake and Harassment Office
(Oct. 20, 1995). Interestingly, initial use of Chapter 142's revised ex parte order in
Ramsey County seems to indicate judges are willing to issue the new protection or-
ders for the full year maximum. Id.
61. Alternate service is possible, yet disfavored in Hennepin and Ramsey Coun-
ties. Telephone Interview with Ann Leppanen, Staff Attorney, Southern Minnesota
Regional Legal Services (Feb. 22, 1996) (commenting that Ramsey County courts
sometimes permit a hearing to be stayed to allow more time for personal service).
Usually only after repeated attempts at personal service prove fruitless is service by
publication permitted. Id. Hennepin County also favors personal service. Tele-
phone Interview with Judge Diana S. Eagon, Hennepin County District Court,
Fourth Judicial District, Hennepin County (Oct. 23, 1995). See supra note 30; see
infra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing alternate service).
62. Telephone Interview with Shawn Fremstad, Staff Attorney, Legal Services
Advocacy Project, (Oct. 10, 1995); see also Telephone Interview with Representative
David Bishop, supra note 35 (expressing concern that initial opposition to Chapter
142 might have been based more on mistrust of the House sponsor's motives than on
the substance of the bill).
63. In the Matter of Orders for Protection for Longer than 14 Days Issuing With-
out a Hearing, Judge William R. Howard, Fourth Judicial District Court, Family
Court Division (Sept. 26, 1992) [hereinafter In the Matter of Orders] (banning issu-
ance of orders for protection for a period of longer than 14 days without a hearing);
see infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (discussing Hennepin County's
concerns).
64. Telephone Interview with Shawn Fremstad, supra note 62.
65. Id.
66. The bill was introduced by Representative Bishop without input or initiative
from the statewide advocacy community. Id. The first reading of the bill occurred in
March 1995. Minutes of House Judiciary Comm., Twenty-Third Meeting, 79th Sess.
(Mar. 31, 1995) (on file with author). Chapter 142's late introduction left only two
months for the bill to pass through both the House and Senate.
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cates were confronted with a difficult choice-scramble to fight the
amendment's passage,67 or try to identify and fix troublesome is-
sues in hopes of passing a worthwhile tool that could be fine-tuned
later.68 Advocates chose the latter option.
The benefits perceived by advocates were largely the same as
those originally anticipated by the judge and legislator responsible
for the bill's introduction. First, victims would not have to go to
court unnecessarily.6 9 Second, petitioners would stand a better
chance of not "losing" their orders if they were unable to attend the
hearing.70 Finally, petitioners would have more control because
67. See Telephone Interview with Shawn Fremstad, supra note 62. Fighting the
proposed legislation might have been taken as a show of bad faith. Indeed, Repre-
sentative Bishop indicated some surprise and dismay at the advocacy community's
initial resistance to his bill. Telephone Interview with Representative David Bishop,
supra note 35. Further, advocates were concerned that resistance to non-advocate
initiated legislative assistance to the problem of domestic violence might chill coop-
eration between advocates and politicians. See Telephone Interview with Shawn
Fremstad, supra note 62.
68. See Telephone Interview with Shawn Fremstad, supra note 62. Despite the
fact that the amendment was not on their "radar screen," domestic abuse advocates
were quick to recognize that the bill had some good things to offer. Id. Because
advocates recognized the difficulties of getting such a comprehensive piece of legisla-
tion passed, the advocacy community generally agreed that it would be better to
focus on getting a workable version of the amendment enacted and then iron out its
problems through subsequent amendments. Id. Oregon has had a similar self-final-
izing ex parte protection order in place since 1977. Telephone Interview with Judith
Armatta, Legal Counsel, Oregon Coalition Against Domestic and Sexual Violence
(Feb. 22, 1996); see also OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 107.718 (Butterworth Supp. II 1994).
69. See SuMMARY AND TaPs, supra note 15, at 8. An advantage of the amendment
is that "women who will not petition for OFPs [orders for protection] knowing that a
hearing is necessary now have a procedure which meets their needs." Id. In addi-
tion, "Southeast Asian women may be reluctant to subject themselves to court pro-
ceedings," and "Is]ome women will lose their jobs if they take time off for court
hearings." Id.
70. See id. ("Some women do not attend the court hearing currently necessary to
finalize OFPs, resulting in dismissal of the OFP."); see also The Danger in Tipping
Off Abusers, STAR TaRe. (Minneapolis), Mar. 31, 1992, at A10 (discussing the need for
ex parte protection orders and commenting on "last ditch efforts" by abusers to "dom-
inate and silence their partners" when ex parte protection orders are not available);
see, e.g., William F. Woo, A Story That Never Made it to Page 1, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), July 1, 1994, at B1l (discussing why one-half of petitioners did not ap-
pear at their final ex parte order hearings).
Under the old provision, the ex parte protection orders of women who did not
attend their hearing would be dismissed regardless of whether the respondent ap-
peared. Telephone Interview with Maria Pastoor, supra note 47. The new provision
makes a petitioner's non-appearance grounds for dismissal only where the respon-
dent has requested a hearing. Thus, a petitioner has a better chance of emerging
from the ex parte protection order process with a valid and lasting order under the
new provision.
This feature may be particularly important for same-sex abuse victims who
otherwise must "out" themselves (expose themselves to the public as homosexual)
when a hearing is required to obtain an ex parte protection order. Telephone Inter-
view with Kim Clements, Legislative Coordinator, Minnesota Coalition for Battered
Women (Feb. 22, 1996).
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they now could choose a level of judicial intervention appropriate
for their unique situations.7 1 For example, if a victim believes her
batterer would benefit from being hauled into court, she could force
his court-ordered appearance by requesting a hearing.72 On the
other hand, if she does not wish to face her abuser, a petitioner
could forego requesting the hearing and stand a good chance of
emerging with a valid, lasting order.73 Advocates hoped that elimi-
nating the disadvantages to using ex parte protection orders would
encourage more victims to file for them.74
The drawbacks advocates perceived included concerns that
Chapter 142's revised protection order would be ineffective and pos-
sibly unconstitutional. The modified notice provision was believed
to have three fundamental flaws. First, if a victim is not personally
notified that the respondent requested a hearing, she could be left
dangerously exposed. When the respondent asks for a hearing, it
must be set by the court within eight to ten days after the re-
quest.7 5 Chapter 142 only requires notification of a victim by mail
at least five days prior to the scheduled hearing date.76 If mail is
71. See Lisa G. Lerman, A Model State Act: Remedies for Domestic Abuse, 21
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 61, 97 (1984) (noting that where a victim does not receive all the
relief requested in her ex parte petition, she may "request a full hearing in order to
obtain all of the relief for which she initially applied"). The importance of providing
victims with "control over their destiny" is well established. See, e.g., Stark, supra
note 5, at 673 (emphasizing that "depriv[ing] women of control over their destin[ies]
reinforc[es] the sense of powerlessness already inflicted by their batterer[s]" and un-
dermines a victim's "satisfaction" with the justice system).
72. See Lerman, supra note 71, at 97 ("[Slometimes the victim knows that the
abuser will not obey the order unless he is told in person by a judge that he must do
so.").
73. This leaves a victim free from the coercive choice of either appearing or hav-
ing her order dismissed. See SUmMARY AND Tips, supra note 15, at 1-2. Of course, if
the respondent requests a hearing the victim will be required to appear. See Domes-
tic Abuse Act, ch. 142, sec. 5, § 7(c), 1995 Minn. Laws 258, 260 (codified as amended
at MmN. STAT. § 518B.01).
74. Telephone Interview with Maria Pastoor, supra note 47; see also The Danger
in Tipping Off Abusers, supra note 70, at A10 (noting that victims' unwillingness to
use protection orders "often hinges on assurances that a partner won't learn of a
protective order"); SumMARY AND Tips, supra note 15, at 8 (stating that "women now
have a procedure which meets their needs better"); see, e.g., Telephone Interview
with Shawn Fremstad, supra note 62 (remarking that women of Southeast Asian
descent are often reluctant to employ remedies that require them to go into court).
See generally Stacy Brustin, Domestic Violence Against Latinas by Latino Males: An
Analysis of Race, National Origin and Gender Differentials, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 231, 248-52 (1994) (explaining the "double bind" minority women face of protect-
ing and empowering: themselves only by outwardly discrediting male members of
their community).
75. See Domestic Abuse Act, ch. 142, sec. 5, § 7(4Xc), 1995 Minn. Laws 258, 260.
76. Id. sec. 4, § 5(a):
If the hearing was requested by the respondent ... service of the notice
... must be made upon the petitioner not less than five days prior to the
hearing. The court shall serve the notice of hearing upon the petitioner
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delayed, a victim may not receive timely notice of a hearing.77
Some victims may be so deep in hiding (especially right after sepa-
ration) that they do not receive the notice. Either way, victims may
miss the scheduled hearings and lose their protection orders.78
Moreover, a victim who mistakenly believes her order is still in
force may face increased danger of physical or emotional abuse.79
Second, the ambiguity inherent in the revised protection order
form itself may make it difficult for police officers to enforce. Under
the previous, two-step, temporary ex parte protection order, the
terms of the order were easily understood because the temporary
order and final order were separate documents.80 The temporary
order was always valid for only fourteen days. If extended, a sepa-
rate final order was issued, thereby making it easy for a law en-
by mail in the manner provided in the rules of civil procedure for plead-
ings subsequent to a complaint and motions.
Id.
77. Telephone Interview with Maria Pastoor, supra note 47; see also Memoran-
dum from Shawn Fremstad, Legal Services Advocacy Project, to Representative
David Bishop (Jan. 11, 1996) (on file with author) Ihereinafter Legal Services
Memorandum].
78. Telephone Interview with Maria Pastoor, supra note 47; see also SuMMARY
AND TiPs, supra note 15, at 8 (describing this very scenario as one of the "disadvan-
tages" to the revised ex parte relief created by Chapter 142). If a petitioner fails to
appear at the hearing, the order is usually dismissed. See id.
79. See Lerman, supra note 71, at 97 (asserting that an abuser may view the
expiration of the ex parte order as "permission from the court to violate the terms of
the order"). Moreover, once the order is dismissed, a respondent will have little in-
centive to stay away from his victim and may feel strengthened or even vindicated by
the court's nullification of the protective order. Thus, a woman may be in increased
danger that her batterer will approach and perhaps attack her should her protection
order expire.
Interestingly, advocates in Oregon, a state that has used "no-hearing" ex parte
protection orders for nearly twenty years, share this concern. Telephone Interview
with Judith Armatta, supra note 68. As a result of a 1995 amendinent, victims in
Oregon now have only five days to react to a respondent-requested hearing con-
testing a temporary custody award. Abuse Prevention Act, ch. 637, sec. 4,
§ 107.716(6), 1995 Or. Laws. Although only passed in July 1995, this shortened time
window for victim response is already proving problematic. Telephone Interview
with Judith Armatta, supra note 68.
80. SuMMaRY AND Tips, supra note 15, at 8. Under the old temporary ex parte
order, police responding to a violation of the order could easily tell whether the order
was valid. Telephone Interview with Maria Pastoor, supra note 47. With the old
order, police simply turned to the appropriate page to see whether or not 14 days had
passed. Id. A separate "final" order was issued following the mandatory hearing.
Id.; see also supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text (explaining the old, temporary
ex parte orders). Now, however, the order as initially issued may be valid for any
period up to a year from issuance. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. Fur-
thermore, ex parte protection orders may automatically convert into a final protec-
tion order. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text It is feared that confusion
about the validity of a victim's documents will leave some law enforcement officers
and judges reluctant to enforce the revised ex parte protection orders. Telephone
Interview with Maria Pastoor, supra note 47.
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forcement officer to ascertain the validity of a victim's protection
order. Now, however, Chapter 142's revised ex parte protection or-
der is a one-step process using only one form; the document initially
issued becomes the final order. Given that the same legal form may
represent a valid final order or an order dismissed following a hear-
ing, it is impossible for a law enforcement officer to determine
whether the victim's order is valid or not by looking at the docu-
ment. Advocates assert that law enforcement officers should al-
ways assume a protection order is valid if within the date shown on
the order's face.81 Nonetheless, concern exists that the new orders'
inherent ambiguity may frustrate officers, or if viewed more cyni-
cally, may provide officers with an excuse not to enforce ex parte
protection orders.82 Either way, the result is an ineffective order
made so largely because officers are disinclined and perhaps even
hostile to enforcing it.
Third, permitting service on an alleged abuser by publication
or mail might mean less effort is placed on personal service.83 If the
court's resources are taxed because, as advocates hope, more vic-
tims request ex parte protection orders, the courts are likely to be
pressured to use the least expensive and most efficient means of
notification. Increased use of "non-personal" service may exacer-
bate enforcement difficulties, particularly where a respondent does
not understand the order nor take seriously its terms.8 4 Further
81. See SuMMARY AND TIps, supra note 15.
82. Telephone Interview with Loretta Frederick, Associate Director, Battered
Women's Justice Project (Feb. 22, 1996); see also SUmMARY AND Tips, supra note 15,
at 8; Telephone Interview with Maria Pastoor, supra note 47. Steps toward alleviat-
ing these concerns, however, could be taken if Minnesota, like other states, were to
implement a state-wide electronic database system that could track and inform law
enforcement agencies of the existence of protection orders. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 107.720(1) (Butterworth Supp. II 1994) (requiring the county sheriff to enter
each "true" protection order into Oregon's computerized records system and impos-
ing a duty on all law enforcement agencies to establish adequate procedures for be-
ing informed of the existence and terms of such orders). See also infra notes 249-50
and accompanying text (discussing the importance of such a data system, and its
lack in Minnesota).
83. If, as anticipated, more victims seek orders, it is reasonable to expect the
sheer increase in volume ofex parte order requests will hamper personal service and
increase pressures on judges and referees to allow "alternate service." See MIEN.
STAT. § 518B.01(8Xc) (1994); id. § 518B.01(5Xb), amended by ch. 142, sec. 4, § 5(b)
1995 Minn. Laws 258, 259. See also supra note 30 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing service by mail or publication).
84. See Telephone Interview with Judge Diana Eagon, supra note 61. Hennepin
County Family Court requires personal service in nearly all cases. The rationale for
this policy is twofold: personal service ensures receipt of the order by respondent and
also increases the likelihood a violation will result in a successful arrest and prosecu-
tion. Id. Moreover, Hennepin County requires that respondent's signed copy of the
notice be provided to the court. Id. See generally Waits, supra note 7, at 308-19
(discussing numerous factors that impede effective arrests when protection orders
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inhibiting the already weak enforcement of protection orders can
only enhance the perception that orders are "worthless pieces of pa-
per."8 5 Aggravating this "paper tiger" problem might, in turn,
heighten a victim's confusion, discomfort, and mistrust of the legal
system.8 6
Additional issues implicit in advocates' concerns include
whether the state may require an alleged abuser to request a hear-
ing, or if in doing so, it shifts an impermissible burden to the re-
spondent. In addition, it seems unclear whether the minimum five-
day window a respondent has for requesting a hearing permits
enough time to make an adequately informed waiver of his right to
a hearing. It is also unclear whether a factually specific affidavit
alleging immediate and present danger of domestic abuse is suffi-
cient to support a final order that evicts an alleged abuser from a
shared home for up to a year. The overall worry is that these con-
cerns, taken together, will make judges and police reluctant to use
and enforce ex parte protection orders.8 7
Critics were also concerned that important deterrence and
credibility-enhancing opportunities would be lost if the legal system
does not initially contact the batterer.88 Pulling an abuser into
court clearly demonstrates that the justice system is outraged at
his abusive conduct, takes the matter seriously, and stands by the
victim.89 Making an abuser face a judge reinforces the idea that
are violated, including the fact that "many ... male police officers will inevitably
identify with the batterer"). See also infra notes 208-10 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the advantages of personal service).
85. See James M. Truss, The Subjection of Women... Still: Unfulfilled Promises
of Protection for Women Victims of Domestic Violence, 26 ST. MARY's L.J. 1149, 1202
(1995) ("[A] protection order that is not enforced is merely an expensive piece of
paper.").
86. See Salzman, supra note 43, at 364 n.141 ("[Flailure to use available sanc-
tions and criminal penalties undermines the public's confidence in the judicial sys-
tem's ability to respond to domestic violence and weakens the effectiveness of each
protection order."); see also Waits, supra note 7, at 309 (noting that arrest is a strong
signal of support for the victim, but is only the first of many messages of support a
victim needs from the legal system in order to successfully leave a violent situation).
87. Telephone Interview with Maria Pastoor, supra note 47; see also SUMMARY
AND Tips, supra note 15 at 8 (listing judges' and law enforcement officers' reluctance
to sign and enforce the new orders as one of the disadvantages of the new ex parte
orders).
88. See, e.g., Legal Services Memorandum, supra note 77, at 2-3 (summarizing
the chief concerns of battered women's advocates).
89. See Michael Dowd, Battered Women: A Perspective on Injustice, 1 CARDOzo
WoM 'S L.J. 1, 31 (1993) (warning that the prosecutor and judge must accompany
the arrest with a "strong message of support for the victim" or else "the arrest will
have little effect on the overall situation"); see also Truss, supra note 85, at 1198
(contending that the judiciary, by treating violations of protective orders too lightly,
further endangers victims and "abdicates" its 'Judicial function"); Waits, supra note
7, at 310 (emphasizing the importance of strict post-arrest responses in order to ef-
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domestic abuse is unacceptable.90 The hearing is also an opportu-
nity to require the respondent to attend counseling. Fewer hear-
ings means fewer batterers will be ordered into treatment. 9 '
Similarly, non-personal service does not send the powerful
messages of condemnation or victim support that personal service
does.92 It also denies the batterer an opportunity to ask questions
about the significance and implications of the order. If early and
critical opportunities to deter and inform alleged abusers are not
utilized, a batterer will be more likely to consider the protection
order against him a worthless pieces of paper or a violation of his
right to due process.
MI. The Constitutionality Question
Almost from the outset there were rumblings that Chapter
142 might be unconstitutional. 9 3 In line with such concerns, Hen-
nepin County Family Court issued a standing "no use" order less
than two months after the enactment of Chapter 142. 94 The "no
use" order prohibits issuing any protection orders for over fourteen
days without a hearing.9 5 Hennepin County indicated it was tak-
fectively begin "a process under which the batterer faces both the carrot and the
stick; if he changes his actions, he will be rewarded; if he doesn't he will be pun-
ished"). See generally Nadine Taub, Adult Domestic Violence: The Law's Response,
in THE LAW OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 327, 331 (J. Ralph Lindgren & Nadine Taub
eds., 1988) (discussing the real and symbolic importance of a serious response to a
woman's call for help).
90. See Legal Services Memorandum, supra note 77, at 2.
91. Id.; see, e.g., State v. Redalen, No. C9-94-945, 1994 WL 714348, at *1 (Minn.
Ct. App. Dec. 27, 1994).
92. See, e.g., Finn, supra note 25, at 171 ("[Mlany batterers will think twice
about committing renewed violence when a police officer arrives, gives the abuser
ten minutes to pack up and leave, and warns that if he returns he will be arrested
and possibly jailed."). In addition, personal service provides the batterer an opportu-
nity, albeit a brief one, to clarify the terms or significance of the order served. This is
one of the reasons Hennepin County requires personal service in nearly all cases.
Telephone Interview with Judge Diana S. Eagon, supra note 61. See also supra note
63.
93. Telephone Interview with Maria Pastoor, supra note 47.
94. See In the Matter of Orders, supra note 63, which provides as follows:
After a review of MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, Subd. 7, as amended effective
August 1, 1995 to provide for the issuance of orders for protection for a
period of a year on an ex parte basis, this court finds that the imple-
mentation of this new provision is not possible in Hennepin County Dis-
trict Court. This court has concerns about the due process implications,
... taking its direction from Baker v. Baker, 494 N.W.2d 282 (Minn.
1992).
IT IS ORDERED:
1. No order for protection for a period of longer than fourteen (14) days
shall be issued without a hearing in Hennepin County Family Court.
95. Id.
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ing its direction from the 1992 Minnesota Supreme Court decision
of Baker v. Baker, which affirmed the constitutionality of two-step,
temporary ex parte protection orders.96
Although ex parte protection orders have been called "the sin-
gle most effective protection the court can provide a battered wo-
man,"97 some critics have long contended the orders are
unconstitutional.9 8 They assert that ex parte orders requiring an
alleged abuser to leave a shared residence involve a deprivation of
constitutional magnitude,9 9 and that the "one-sided nature" of the
deprivation violates a respondent's right to due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment.10 0
"Judicial reticence" to issue ex parte protection orders because of concerns they
violate a respondent's due process rights is discussed in numerous secondary
sources. See, e.g., Mullins, supra note 21, at 246; FnN & COLSON, supra note 18, at
2; Lerman, supra note 71, at 91; Kinports & Fischer, supra note 8, at 209; Taub,
supra note 23, at 118.
96. Baker v. Baker, 494 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992). See infra part III.A (discuss-
ing the Baker decision).
97. Finn, supra note 25, at 171.
98. See, e.g., id. at 170 (remarking that some judges and defense attorneys have
expressed concern "that an ex parte hearing that results in the exclusion of a bat-
terer from the home might violate the respondent's due process rights").
99. Although federal courts have not directly considered the assertion that ex
parte protection orders cause deprivations with constitutional implications, appel-
late courts have recognized the respondent's interest in remaining in the home. See,
e.g., Geisinger v. Voss, 352 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of an ex parte order to vacate a shared home in a divorce proceeding). The
court stated:
There is an old saw that a man's house is his castle. If modern times
will not permit him moats and battlements, it still remains, I strongly
suspect, that the constitution insists that he be allowed, except in ex-
ceptional circumstances, a few words before the sheriff escorts him out
the door.
Id. at 111. See also infra notes 130-31, 143 and accompanying text (discussing the
respondent's interest in his home).
100. "The essential guarantee of the due process clause is that of fairness." JOHN
E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, TREATISE ON CONSTITUIoNAL LAw: SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE § 17.8, at 656 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter SUBSTANCE AND PROCE-
DURE]. Any consideration of due process includes two components: substantive due
process and procedural due process.
Substantive due process permits judicial review of governmental actions limit-
ing the exercise of "fundamental" constitutional rights. JoHN E. NowAK & RONALD
D. ROTUNDA, TREATISE ON CONSTrrurIoNAL LAw § 11.7, at 388 (4th ed. 1991). "Fun-
damental" rights are those rights recognized as "so essential to individual liberty in
our society that they justify the justices reviewing the acts of other branches." Id.
The concept of fundamental substantive rights is "no more than the modern recogni-
tion of ... natural law" because under its banner, courts are able to protect funda-
mental rights not expressly enumerated in the Constitution. Id. at 388, 390; see,
e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (advocating
the protection of a right of privacy which includes the right of married persons to use
contraceptives); see also Quinn, supra note 8, at 847 n.25 ("Substantive due process
proscribes government action that so 'offends certain decencies of civilized conduct'
that no amount of procedural protection is sufficient."); see, e.g., Rochin v. California,
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In an effort to avoid due process challenges,lOl legislators in
Minnesota and elsewhere made ex parte protection orders tempo-
rary and limited to situations involving an "immediate threat of vio-
lence." 10 2 The constitutionality of this limited two-step temporary
342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) (invalidating the forcible extraction of incriminating sub-
stances from petitioner's stomach).
Procedural due process proscribes government action that denies an individual
"the right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind."
Id. (citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)). For procedural due process to be satisfied, procedures
must be:
fundamentally fair to the individual in the resolution of the factual and
legal basis for government actions which deprive him of life, liberty and
property.... If there is a deprivation of life, liberty or property which is
based on disputed facts or issues, then the individual whose interests
are affected must be granted a fair procedure before a fair decision-
maker.
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, supra, at 656, 662.
101. Barbara E. Sanson, Spouse Abuse: A Novel Remedy for an Historic Problem,
84 DICK. L. REV. 147, 162 (1979) (arguing that procedural clarification, such as "im-
mediate and present danger of abuse," would obviate the due process problems that
plague ex parte orders); see also Taub, supra note 23, at 98 (outlining the concern
that ex parte orders of protection raise "serious constitutional questions").
102. Prior to its amendment in 1995, Minnesota's Domestic Abuse Act offered pre-
cisely such limited ex parte relief. MNmN. STAT. § 518B.01(7) (1994). The pertinent
portions of the unamended 1994 Act provides as follows:
Subd. 7. Temporary order. (a) Where an application under this section
alleges an immediate and present danger of domestic abuse, the court
may grant an ex parte temporary order for protection, pending a full
hearing and granting relief as the court deems proper, including an
order:
(1) Restraining the abusing party from committing acts of domes-
tic abuse;
(2) Excluding any party from the dwelling they share or from the
residence of the other except by further order of the court....
(b) a finding by the court that there is a basis for issuing an ex
parte temporary order for protection constitutes a finding that sufficient
reasons exist not to require notice under applicable court rules gov-
erning applications for ex parte temporary relief.
(c) An ex parte temporary order for protection shall be effective for
a fixed period not to exceed 14 days, except for good cause as provided
under paragraph (d). A full hearing, as provided by this section, shall
be set for not later than seven days from the issuance of the temporary
order. The respondent shall be served forthwith a copy of the ex parte
order along with a copy of the petition and notice of the date set for the
hearing.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Baker, 494 N.W.2d at 285 (characterizing the relief
provided under Mim. STAT. § 518B.01(7) as "a 'band-aid' designed to curtail the
harm one household member may be doing to the other in the short term, until a
more permanent dispute resolution can be put in place").
In 1993, 42 states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia provided for pre-
liminary ex parte relief based on the petitioner's affidavit or testimony. Klein &
Orloff, supra note 4, at 1037 n.1471 (providing a detailed accounting of temporary
protection orders nationally).
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ex parte relief requiring a hearing to become a final remedy was
affirmed by a number of cases,1 0 3 including Minnesota's Baker.104
A Baker and the Validity of Ex Parte Protection Orders
Before Chapter 142
In Baker, the respondent challenged the ex parte temporary
protection order sought by and provided to his estranged wife.1Os
The respondent attacked the relief ordered by the court, which
awarded his wife custody of their children and evicted him from
the family home.1Oe The alleged abuser also challenged the notice
103. Although no United States Supreme Court case directly addresses ex parte
civil protection orders, a number of courts have addressed and rejected claims that
such orders violate due process in domestic abuse cases. See Blazel v. Bradley, 698
F. Supp. 756, 768 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (holding that ex parte orders do not violate due
process generally, but do if the order was wrongly issued); State ex rel. Williams v.
Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 229-32 (Mo. 1982) (upholding the Missouri Adult Abuse
Act's provision for temporary ex parte relief); Marquette v. Marquette, 686 P.2d. 990,
995-96 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding restrictions on respondent's visitation with
his children because the procedural safeguards,.which provided for a hearing within
ten days, supplied adequate due process); Boyle v. Boyle, 12 Pa. D. & C.3d. 767
(1979) (finding that Pennsylvania's Protection From Abuse Act, which provided for
the ex parte eviction of respondent, was constitutional); Schramek v. Borhen, 429
N.W.2d 501, 504-06 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (rejecting respondent's claim that the no-
tice provided him was insufficient). Like Baker, however, all of these cases, with the
exception of Blazel, addressed temporary ex parte relief in cases of immediate threat
of violence.
Even though there appear to be no cases addressing ex parte relief finalized
without a hearing, a few authors have cursorily addressed the matter. See MODEL
CODE ON DOMEsTIC AND FAmLY VIOLENCE § 307, commentary at 29 (Nat'l Council of
Juv. and Fain. Ct. Judges) (1994) [hereinafter MODEL CODE] (noting that as long as
service of process affords both parties adequate time to respond to the option to re-
quest a hearing, due process should be satisfied); Lerman, supra note 71, at 95 (sug-
gesting that ex parte orders that do not require a final hearing should survive a
constitutional challenge if appropriate due process protections are provided).
104. Baker, 494 N.W.2d at 282 (holding that the procedures of the Domestic
Abuse Act did not have to satisfy the notice requirements of Minnesota's marriage
dissolution statute).
105. The temporary ex parte protection order initially excluded James Baker from
Barbara Baker's residence, restrained him from harassing her at work, and awarded
her custody of their child. Id. at 283. After a full hearing, the court ordered that
temporary custody of the child remain with Barbara Baker. Id.
106. Upon Mrs. Baker's initial affidavit and motion, the trial court granted her
temporary custody of the couple's infant and provided for the father's visitation. Id.
at 283. A full hearing was scheduled, and Mr. Baker was notified pursuant to the
statute. Id. At the full hearing, the trial court granted each party a final order for
protection and ordered that temporary custody remain with Mrs. Baker for the next
year. Id. at 284.
The respondent challenged the trial court's award of custody and authorization
of visitation rights, alleging that the court's findings were inadequate. Baker v.
Baker, 481 N.W.2d. 871, 872, 874 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). The respondent asserted,
and the Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed, that "statutory provisions which govern
the issuance of temporary restraining orders in dissolution proceedings also control
in the domestic abuse setting." Baker, 494 N.W.2d at 289. Specifically, the court of
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provided him as statutorily and constitutionally inade-
quate. 10 7
In rejecting these claims, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted
that requiring pre-deprivation notice to an alleged abuser would en-
danger the victim, thereby defeating the Domestic Abuse Act's goal
of providing victims with immediate protection. 10 8 The Baker court
reasoned that because the Act is a unique provision offering relief to
persons at risk of ongoing domestic violence,109 ex parte protection
appeals held that MiNN. STAT. § 518.131(3) controlled, providing that "no ex parte
order may grant custody of minor children to 'either party except upon a finding by
the court of immediate danger or physical harm' to the children." Id. Moreover, the
court of appeals held that the appropriate standard for the custody inquiry was the
"best interests" of the child, as outlined in MqN. STAT. § 257.025(a), rather than the
"safety of the victim and child" called for by the Domestic Abuse Act. Id. Accord-
ingly, the court of appeals remanded the custody order for further findings. Baker,
481 N.W.2d at 875.
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding
that "determinations of custody and visitation made at the time of the issuance of an
ex parte order for protection are governed by MIN. STAT. § 518B.01(6)(a)(3), giving
primary consideration to the safety of the victim and the children." Baker, 494
N.W.2d at 289. The court emphasized that custody orders, like the one at issue, are
"intended to be temporary and generally either expire or are reviewed by the court
one year from their issuance." Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). In addition,
the court reasoned that while both parents have "strong interests in the custody and
enjoyment of their child, a parent's love and affection must yield to considerations of
the child's welfare." Id. at 287. Further, the court added that the Domestic Abuse
Act recognizes the preeminence of the child's welfare by allowing temporary custody
only when "primary consideration [is given] to the safety of the victim or the chil-
dren." Id. at 288 (citations omitted).
107. Mr. Baker alleged that the ex parte order's issuance without an attempt to
contact him (or explain why contact was not attempted) violated MIN. R. Civ. P.
65.01, MINN. GEN. R. PRAc. 3.01, and violated his right to due process. Baker, 481
N.W.2d. at 873. The Minnesota Supreme Court, therefore, was asked to determine
whether proceeding for temporary relief under the Domestic Abuse Act, MIaN. STAT.
§ 518B.01 conformed to notice requirements under MiNN. R. Civ. P. 65.01 and MR-N.
GEN. R. PRAc. 303.04. Baker, 494 N.W.2d. at 284. The court held that while the
other notice provisions did govern in a majority of cases, they did not apply in the
present case because the Domestic Abuse Act incorporated alternative procedures
into its statutory remedy as part of the substantive relief. Id. at 286. The court
added, however, that this construction did not immunize the Act's notice provision
from due process scrutiny. Id. at 287.
Interestingly, the court also added that even if it would have found that MINN.
R. CIv. P. 65.01 and MuqN. GEN. R. PRAc. 303.04 did control the issuance of ex parte
protection orders, the outcome would have been the same because "in extraordinary
circumstances where risk of injury is plain, relief may be granted without notice."
Id. Thus, the court held that when a petitioner asserts fear of further domestic vio-
lence accompanied by a supporting affidavit under oath (as occurred in this case), it
meets the requirements of MunN. R. Civ. P. 65.01 and Mu'NN. GEN. R. PRAc. 3.01 and
303.04 as well as the requirements of the Domestic Abuse Act. Id.
108. Baker, 494 N.W.2d at 288. "The Domestic Abuse Act, MINN. STAT.
§ 518B.01, was enacted in 1979 as one way to protect victims of domestic assault."
Id. at 285.
109. Id. at 285. The court reasoned that the Act was different from the marriage
dissolution statute because the Act neither terminated nor established a legal rela-
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is "central to the substantive relief provided for under the Act."11o
The court held, therefore, that requiring pre-deprivation notice was
simply inappropriate and could actually precipitate increased
violence."'l
The Baker court acknowledged, however, that even where
post-deprivation notice is preferred, the question of whether such
notice violates an alleged abuser's due process rights remains a sep-
arate inquiry.112 Recognizing that due process requirements must
be flexible and particular to the situation,' 13 the Baker court deter-
mined that the applicable due process test combined "general Ma-
thews factors"114 and "more specific Fuentes factors."115
The Mathews factors determine whether a post-deprivation
hearing sufficiently protects the respondent's due process interests
under the circumstances."16 The Mathews analysis consists of
weighing three factors: the private interests affected; the proce-
dural safeguards provided (looking specifically at the risk of errone-
ous deprivation resulting from the procedures and the probable
value of additional safeguards); and the government's interest."17
tionship. Id. In addition, the court reasoned that the Act was like a "band aid" be-
cause it was designed to curtail the harm one member of a household might be doing
to another in the short term until a more permanent resolution of the problem could
be put in place. Id.
110. Id. at 286. The court added that notice or extensive justification for lack of
notice prior to issuing an order would impede a victim's ability to obtain the immedi-
ate remedy and extraordinary relief the statute contemplates. Id.
111. Id. at 286 (citing Blazel, 698 F.Supp. at 763). Research on domestic abuse
supports the assertion that a victim's risk of danger increases once she takes steps to
leave the batterer. See Waits, supra note 7, at 283 (noting that "a batterer usually
becomes even more abusive if his partner makes any attempt to assert control over
her own life"); Quinn, supra note 8, at 870 ("The defendant might react to the news
of a victim's action with anger or increased violence.").
112. Baker, 494 N.W.2d at 287.
113. Id. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972):
Although... due process tolerates variances in the form of a hearing
'appropriate to the nature of the case". . . and "depending upon the
importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent
proceedings"... the Court has traditionally insisted that whatever its
form, opportunity for that hearing must be provided before the depriva-
tion at issue takes effect.
Id. at 82.
114. Baker, 494 N.W.2d at 288. See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
335 (1976) (applying a three-factor analysis to determine that a pre-termination
hearing is not required before government officials can temporarily deprive a peti-
tioner of social security benefits).
115. Baker, 494 N.W.2d at 288; Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90, 92 (holding that Florida
and Pennsylvania replevin provisions violate due process because they deprive indi-
viduals without the opportunity for a pre-deprivation hearing when no "extraordi-
nary situation" exists to justify a post-deprivation hearing).
116. See SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 100, at 663.
117. Baker, 494 N.W.2d. at 287. See also SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, supra note
100, at 145 (Supp. 1995).
1996]
Law and Inequality
Using Mathews, the Baker court concluded that the respon-
dent's significant interest in having custody of his child and in re-
maining in the home did not outweigh the value of the safeguards
provided and the government's interest.118 The court paid particu-
lar attention to four components it said represented "extensive pro-
cedural safeguards" minimizing the risk of erroneous
deprivation:119 (1) ex parte orders are issued only upon a peti-
tioner's sworn and factually specific affidavit; (2) only judges or
[Tlhe majority's use of the Mathews three-factor analysis to determine
whether a post-deprivation hearing would be sufficient to protect lib-
erty or property interests almost certainly will stand the test of time.
For two decades a majority of Justices have ruled that an individual
should be given notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to a signifi-
cant deprivation of a life, liberty, or property interest unless the Court,
using the three-factor analysis, concludes that a post-deprivation pro-
cess would provide fundamental fairness to the individual.
Id.
118. Baker, 494 N.W.2d at 288. Although the court reviewed the respondent's
interest in remaining in his shared dwelling, it focused mostly on the respondent's
parental interest in maintaining custody of his child. Id. at 287.
While custody merits consideration, it is not within the scope of this Note. This
Note seeks only to address the "simple case" of eviction from a shared dwelling with-
out a hearing for two reasons. First, this Note endeavors only to show the door of
constitutionality is open; it does not seek to conjecture how wide. The issue of cus-
tody warrants its own balancing under the factors enumerated by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Baker. Second, the scope of the protection provided by the revised
ex parte protection order is unclear and arguably may be limited to eviction and a
prohibition on violent acts.
This confusion stems from the fact that Chapter 142 speaks equivocally as to the
scope of appropriate relief. See MiN. STAT. § 518B.01(7) (1994) amended by ch. 142,
sec. 5, § 7, 1995 Minn. Laws 258, 259. As amended, subdivision 7(a) expressly au-
thorizes "granting relief as the court deems proper, including an order: (1) re-
straining the abusing party from committing acts of domestic abuse; (2) excluding
any party from the dwelling." Id. (emphasis added). However, the newly added sub-
division 7(e) adds that "[i]f the petitioner seeks relief in subdivision b, other than the
relief described in paragraph (a), the petitioner must request a hearing to obtain the
additional relief." Id. § 518.B01(7(e). Thus, while Chapter 142 seems to set out a
broad scope of protection with inclusive examples in subdivision (e), it goes on to
require hearings for all relief not enumerated in subdivision 7(a). See id.
§ 518.BO1(6) (discussing the additional relief available, including temporary custody
and visitation, support, counseling and treatment, and temporary property awards).
As a result, some are unsure custody and visitation were intended to be part of
the self-finalizing ex parte relief created by Chapter 142. See Telephone Interview
with Maria Pastoor, supra note 47; see also SUMMARY AND TIps, supra note 15, at 2
(stating that the Battered Women's Legal Advocacy Project "recommends that peti-
tioners usually request hearings when obtaining an ex parte custody order"). Advo-
cates are wary that including custody determinations would increase judicial
reluctance to issue ex parte relief. In addition, some are doubtful ex parte custody
orders would be upheld as constitutional under the limits of Baker. Telephone Inter-
view with Maria Pastoor, supra note 47. But see OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 107.718
(Butterworth Supp. II 1994). Oregon, a state that has used "no hearing" ex parte
protection orders for nearly twenty years, includes custody and visitation in the list
of remedies available to a qualified petitioner for up to one year. Id. § 107.718(l)(a).
119. Baker, 494 N.W.2d. at 288.
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referees could issue the orders; (3) the orders were temporary; and
(4) the respondent had to receive notice of a pending full hear-
ing.12o The court added that the government has an "extraordi-
nary" interest in fostering a society free of violence and in
protecting "vulnerable persons," particularly those at risk of
harm.12 1 Thus, after balancing the interests at stake, the court
concluded that a post-deprivation hearing pursuant to the Domestic
Abuse Act would sufficiently protect an alleged abuser's right to due
process. 122
Although the Baker court used Mathews to determine whether
a mandatory post-deprivation hearing would adequately protect a
respondent's right to due process, it relied on Fuentes to assess
whether postponing notice and the opportunity for a hearing might
be warranted by "extraordinary" circumstances. 2 3 Extraordinary
circumstances is a narrow exception to the general pre-deprivation
hearing requirement. The exception permits a government to seize
an individual's property without opportunity for a prior hearing
only where the seizure is directly necessary to secure an important
governmental or public interest, where a special need for prompt
action exists, or where the state strictly controls its power to seize
property by limiting such authority to a government official acting
under "the standards of a narrowly drawn statute." 2 4 Fuentes,
therefore, considers only the needs and actions of the state in deter-
mining whether a post-deprivation hearing adequately protects a
deprived individual's interests.125
The Baker court concluded that the temporary ex parte order
provision fell within the Fuentes exception because the state had a
120. Id.; see also Finn, Statutory Authority, supra note 18, at 53 (citing Boyle v.
Boyle, 12 Pa. D. & C.3d 767 (1979)) (noting that the Pennsylvania district court,
when faced with a similar constitutionality challenge, held that subordinating the
respondents interest and due process rights to the victim's right to immediate pro-
tection was consistent with Fuentes).
121. Baker, 494 N.W.2d at 288.
122. See id.
123. Id.; see Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90.
That a hearing required by due process is subject to waiver, and is not
fixed in form does not affect its root requirement that an individual be
given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any signifi-
cant property interest, except for extraordinary situations where some
valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the
hearing until after the event.
Id. at 82 (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971)); see also Finn,
Statutory Authority, supra note 18, at 53 (defining Fuentes as standing for the prem-
ise that "a court may forego notice in certain... cases if... the situation has a
special need for prompt action").
124. Baker, 494 N.W.2d. at 288.
125. Id. The cost to the individual is not a relevant consideration. See Fuentes,
407 U.S. at 91.
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strong and undisputed interest in protecting the public from domes-
tic violence.12 6 Moreover, a special need for prompt action existed
because the Act limited ex parte relief to situations of "immediate
and present danger of domestic abuse."127 Finally, the state
strictly controlled its power to seize property because a judge or ju-
dicial officer had to first determine that the narrow terms of the Act
were met before granting ex parte relief.128 Based on these consid-
erations, the court concluded that domestic violence constituted an
"extraordinary situation" in which the government need not provide
the alleged abuser with pre-deprivation notice and an opportunity
for a hearing. 129
Baker affirmed that the Domestic Violence Act's two-step,
temporary ex parte protection order, in its pre-Chapter 142 form,
did not violate an alleged abuser's right to due process. Chapter
142, however, expands ex parte relief beyond the limits defined in
Baker. The question implicit in advocates' concerns, and especially
Hennepin County's standing "no use" order, is whether Baker's af-
firmation of constitutionality can be extended to the one-step, self-
finalizing ex parte relief created by Chapter 142.
B. Reconsidering Chapter 142: Due Process Concerns
An individual's interest in remaining in a shared domicile is
likely to be considered a deprivation with constitutional implica-
tions.1 30 Depriving an individual of this right, however, does not
126. Baker, 494 N.W.2d. at 288. "While at first blush, it may seem that the inter-
est at issue here is a purely private one ... it is also true that the general public has
an extraordinary interest in a society free from violence." Id.
127. Id. "[Tihere can be no argument that a special need for prompt action is
shown." Id. See MN. STAT. § 518B.01(7)(a) (1994), amended by ch. 142, sec. 5,
§ 7(a), 1995 Minn. Laws 258, 259 (stating that ex parte relief will issue only if the
court, in its discretion, deems that petitioner has adequately alleged "an immediate
and present danger of domestic abuse").
128. Baker, 494 N.W.2d. at 288. "[Tlhe statute is very narrowly drawn and, of
course, compliance with its terms must be determined by a district court judge or
other judicial officer before ex parte relief is available." Id. See MINM. STAT.
§ 518B.01(3) (1994) (establishing that either judges or referees may take evidence
and report on ex parte actions).
129. Baker, 494 N.W.2d. at 288.
130. At least one member of the United States Supreme Court has suggested an
occupancy interest rises to the level of a fundamental right. See Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 520-22 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment);
see also Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 446-69 (1982) (holding that eviction notices
posted on apartment doors do not provide adequate notice to protect residents' prop-
erty interest). For a more exhaustive discussion of the asserted property interest in
remaining in the home, see Quinn, supra note 8, at 858-63. See also supra note 99.
But see Quinn, supra note 8, at 847; Mullins, supra note 21, at 247-48 (asserting
that evicting the abuser is the only fair solution because any other response further
victimizes the woman by forcing her to flee her home when she has committed no
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automatically amount to a constitutional violation. An individual's
constitutional rights are violated only when a deprivation is accom-
plished without due process of law.1S1 The issue, therefore, is
whether a self-finalizing ex parte protection order, which provides
for a discretionary post-deprivation hearing, adequately provides
due process of law.
In Goldberg v. Kelly,132 the United States Supreme Court
found the termination of welfare benefits without a pre-deprivation
hearing unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that a post-depriva-
tion hearing was insufficient because the benefits were essential to
the respondent's survival. 133 Consequently, the individual's inter-
est outweighed the inadequate safeguards and nominal government
interest at stake.134 In its subsequent Mathews v. Eldridge 135 deci-
sion, however, the Court upheld the termination of social security
disability benefits where only a post-deprivation hearing was avail-
able.13 6 The Court reasoned that disability benefits were not essen-
tial in nature and,13 7 therefore, did not outweigh adequate
safeguards and a legitimate government interest. 138
crime); but cf Baker, 494 N.W. 2d at 287 n.6 (noting that the victim's interest in her
personal security also constitutes a liberty interest of considerable weight). See gen-
erally Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 637 (1977) (discussing the nature of liberty
interests); Topliffe, supra note 8, at 1056-57 (discussing potential liberty interests
implicated by the issuance of mutual protection orders).
131. Baker v. Collan, 413 U.S. 137, 145 (1979) (stressing that the Due Process
Clause "protects only against deprivation of liberty accomplished 'without due pro-
cess of law' ").
132. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
133. Id. at 264. The Court focused on the urgency of the need for the benefit,
emphasizing that recipients of welfare benefits are on the margin of subsistence. Id.
134. Id.
135. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
136. Id. at 349.
137. The Court reasoned that social security disability benefits, unlike welfare
benefits, were not likely to be the recipient's sole means of support. Id. at 341. The
Court concluded that the potential harm resulting from an erroneous deprivation of
social security disability benefits is less severe than an erroneous deprivation of wel-
fare benefits. Id. at 340-41.
138. The Court reasoned that the deprivation decision was based on sufficient in-
formation (a periodic questionnaire) and that the post-deprivation procedure pro-
vided a sufficient means for the recipient to contest the decision. Id. at 345-46. The
Court noted that the degree of harm and duration of the government-caused depriva-
tion were important to its analysis. Id. at 341-42.
The Court's post-Eldridge decisions seem to give considerable deference to the
public interest for several reasons. First, state statutes are presumed constitutional.
See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 201, 207 (1976) (opting not to construe a
death penalty statute so broadly as to find it unconstitutional). Second, the Court
has given considerable deference to the body formulating the procedure when apply-
ing the Mathews balancing test. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 473 (1983)
(using Mathews to uphold prison regulations because prison officials should be given
great deference). Moreover, where individual interests are balanced against the
public interest, the government usually wins. See, e.g., Mackey v, Montrym, 443
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Although evicting a respondent from a shared dwelling for up
to a year imposes a definite hardship, it does not constitute a mat-
ter of survival for most alleged batterers. 139 In addition, because
the respondent can request a hearing at any time,140 the depriva-
tion need be no longer than it was at the time of Baker.141 Even at
its most extreme, the pre-hearing deprivation is considerably less
than the ten to eleven months upheld as constitutional in Ma-
thews. 142 Thus, the respondent's interest in access to a shared
dwelling, although significant, does not constitute a deprivation so
egregious it cannot be outweighed.143
U.S. 1 (1979) (upholding a state law summary suspension of a driver's license on a
refusal to take a breath analysis test because of the public's interest in safety).
139. See Quinn, supra note 8, at 864 n.180 (noting that men may be better able to
find alternate shelter because they have more financial resources and are usually
unencumbered by children); see also Mullins, supra note 21, at 247-48 (asserting
that the only alternative to a batterer's eviction would be to force the victim to flee,
thereby further victimizing her even though she was not the one who acted wrongly).
140. An ex parte order for protection remains effective until modified or vacated
by the court. See Domestic Abuse Act, ch. 142, sec. 5, § 7(c), 1995 Minn. Laws 258,
260 (codified as amended at MrN. STAT. § 518B.01). Even if the alleged abuser does
not request a full hearing during the window of time specified by Chapter 142, he
can request a hearing to modify the order at any time during the year it is in effect.
MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(11) (1994). Moreover, a protection order is appealable as a
final order in a special proceeding. Rigwald v. Rigwald, 423 N.W.2d 701, 705 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1988).
141. Under the old temporary ex parte order, a hearing was set for seven days
from issuance of the order. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(7Xa) (1994). Continuances were
available to ensure the respondent would have at least five days notice. Id. sec. 4,
§ 5(a). Under the revised self-finalizing order, a hearing requested by the petitioner
will occur in not less than seven days from the order's issuance. See id. sec. 5, § 7(b).
If the hearing is instead requested by respondent, it will occur in not more than 10
days from the issuance of the order. Id. Again, both parties shall have a minimum
of five days to respond to the order. See id. sec. 4, § 5(a), sec. 5, § 7(c).
142. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341-42 (holding that no prior evidentiary hearing was
required where social security disability benefits were cut off). The court reasoned
that the potential harm of erroneous deprivation to a recipient of disability benefits
is likely to be less than that of a Goldberg welfare recipient. Id.; cf Kinports &
Fischer, supra note 8, at 195 (contending that requiring the respondent to vacate
"provides additional deterrence to criminal behavior, whereas requiring victims to do
so would discourage them from seeking the needed protection," and reward the
offender).
143. When violence has been alleged and found, the respondent's forced departure
from a shared home in which the petitioner also has a legal interest is indeed a less
severe deprivation than those set aside in other cases. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 584 (1979) (upholding a child's civil commitment without a hearing based on the
independent judgment of physician).
In evaluating whether the deprivation outweighs the state interest, the Court
has also examined the means-ends fit. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971)
(invalidating a license revocation scheme because it failed to consider fault, the very
factor the state itself deemed central to its statutory purpose); Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.S. 89 (1965) (rejecting a blanket exclusion depriving all servicemen the right
to vote as an inadequate means to further the "powerful" state interest in restricting
its electorate to bona fide residents).
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On balance, the safeguards in place and the strong govern-
ment interest in preventing domestic violence outweigh the respon-
dent's interest in the shared dwelling.144 In Baker, the court relied
on four key safeguards inherent in the temporary ex parte order: (1)
the order would issue only upon a petitioner's sworn and factually
specific affidavit; (2) only judges or referees could issue orders; (3)
the orders were temporary; and (4) the respondent had to receive
notice of a pending full hearing. 145
Admittedly, Chapter 142 alters two of the safeguards. Ex
parte protection orders are no longer "very short term," nor do they
precede "notice of a full hearing."146 These changes, however, do
not mean that the revised ex parte protection order provision fails
to provide adequate safeguards. On the contrary, the changes
merely necessitate a reevaluation of the adequacy of the safeguards
now provided by the revised ex parte protection order. Chapter 142
simply leaves the length of the deprivation and the need for a hear-
ing to the discretion of the parties. 147 Nothing in the due process
mandate indicates that such a change is per se unconstitutional. 148
In fact, "due process of law does not require a hearing 'in every
conceivable case of government impairment of a private inter-
est.' "149 The essential guarantee is that the procedure be funda-
Evicting a batterer from the home is distinguishable from either Bell or Car-
rington, however, because it is a means directly related to achieving the end of
preventing domestic violence. See Mullins, supra note 21, at 246 (asserting that
batterer eviction is one way to protect women from further abuse while increasing
the likelihood that criminal prosecution will proceed). Admittedly, however, other
deprivations, such as the denial of visitation and custody may involve more compel-
ling individual interests. See supra note 118. These arguably more egregious depri-
vations must be weighed against the procedural safeguards and state's interest to
determine whether due process has been adequately provided.
144. See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 538 (1981) (affirming that "post
deprivation remedies made available by the state can satisfy the Due Process
Clause," especially where immediate state action is necessary), rev'd on other
grounds, Baker v. Baker, 494 N.W.2d 282, 288 (Minn. 992) (discussing the public's
"extraordinary interest" in a society free from violence and the state's "strong inter-
est" in preventing domestic violence).
145. Baker, 494 N.W.2d at 288.
146. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text (discussing the substance of
Chapter 142).
147. Id.
148. See SUBsrANCE & PROCEDURE, supra note 100, at 662. Where there is a dep-
rivation of life, liberty, or property, due process requires that "the individual whose
interests are affected must be granted a fair procedure before a fair decision-maker.
However, this principle does not mean that the individual has the right to a hearing
before the action is taken or even to any personal hearing at any time." Id.; see, e.g.,
Parratt, 451 U.S. at 527 (affirming that "post deprivation remedies made available
by the state can satisfy the Due Process Clause," especially where immediate state
action is necessary); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
149. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650 (1972) (quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894) (1961)). It is important to remember
1996]
Law and Inequality
mentally fair.150 Due process requires that one be afforded an
opportunity to make a meaningful response in a meaningful
way. 1 5 1 Courts have interpreted this mandate to require an impar-
tial decision-maker and adequate notice.' 5 2 "[I]n any proceeding
which is to be accorded finality... [notice must be] reasonably cal-
culated, under all circumstances, to appraise interested parties of
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to pres-
ent their objections."15 3
Meaningful notice and opportunity to respond are not hin-
dered by Chapter 142 because the modified Act provides several ac-
ceptable means for serving notice. Personal service on an alleged
abuser is preferred, but where impossible or impracticable, notice
may be served by publication or mail. 154 Publication and mail ser-
vice have been found adequate in a number of civil contexts.' 5 5
Moreover, given the victim's need for safety and prompt action,15 6
that due process is a "flexible concept" and does not indicate a "procedure universally
applicable to every situation." Id. The constraints required by due process are de-
pendent on the circumstances and interests at issue. Id.
150. SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE, supra note 100, at 656.
151. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
152. See SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE, supra note 100, at 656-58.
153. Id. at 661 (emphasis added); see also Quinn, supra note 8, at 871-72.
154. See MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(8)(c) (1994). The decision to permit the use of
such alternate service is left to the discretion of the judge. Id.
155. See, e.g., McIntee v. State Dep't of Public Safety, 279 N.W.2d 817, 820 (Minn.
1979) (holding that delivery of a license revocation notice via certified mail to a re-
spondent's postbox of five years was sufficient to constitute "constructive delivery" of
notice despite respondent's failure to pick up his mail); Elliott v. Franklin, No. CX-
92-1968, 1993 WL 129633, at *2 (Mirm. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, July 15, 1993.
(finding service by publication in a personal injury case adequate when a respondent
purposely avoided service pursuant to MmN. R. CIv. P. 4.04); Har-Ned Lumber Co. v.
Amagineers, Inc., 436 N.W.2d 811, 814-15 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (concluding that
service of a mechanic's lien statement via certified mail was timely despite recipi-
ent's failure to respond to the notice). But see Young v. Mt. Hawley Ins., 864 F.2d 81,
82 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (finding service by mail ineffective when a party re-
ceived papers by certified mail and signed the return receipt, but did not return the
acknowledgment of service form); Etzler v. Mondale, 151 N.W.2d 603, 611 (Minn.
1963) (deeming service by publication inadequate before a district court could order
a platted street vacated pursuant to MiNN. STAT. § 505.14).
Generally a party may secure service by publication or mail by making an ap-
propriate affidavit that meets the statutory requirements of the relevant rule. See
Van Rhee v. Dysert, 191 N.W. 53, 53 (Minn. 1922). However, due process is the
ultimate inquiry regarding the adequacy of service. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318 (1950) (holding that statutory notice
by publication was inadequate on judicial settlement of accounts by the trustee of a
common trust fund); Meadowbrook Manor, Inc. v. City of St. Louis Park, 104
N.W.2d 540, 543 (Minn. 1960) (applying Mullane to a tax assessment case and hold-
ing statutory notice by publication did not comply with due process).
156. See Baker, 494 N.W.2d at 288 (citing MIN. STAT. § 518B.01(7)(a))
("Ilinasmuch as the statute requires an allegation of an 'immediate and present dan-
ger of domestic abuse,'. . . there can be no argument that a special need for prompt
action is shown.").
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and the respondent's ability to vacate a wrongfully issued protec-
tion order at any time,1 5 7 publication and mail service adequately
protect due process under the circumstances.15 8 Assuming the
methods of service survive scrutiny,15 9 the only other factor war-
ranting evaluation is whether due process is satisfied when the
state provides an alleged abuser notice of an opportunity to request
a hearing, or whether the state is obliged to set a hearing and notify
the respondent of it.
An unconstitutional burden does not result when a respondent
is required to indicate his desire for a hearing. Neither Goldberg
nor Mathews came close to suggesting that, in the interest of due
process, the government agency responsible for the deprivation
should go so far as scheduling a hearing for the deprived individual.
Such a holding would lead to extreme administrative inefficiency
and a misuse of scarce government resources.
The importance of administrative efficiency in judicial analy-
sis should not be underestimated.160 In Califano v. Boles,161 for
example, the United States Supreme Court upheld ex parte depri-
vations on the basis of administrative convenience alone.162 The
Court concluded that the Social Security system could not sustain
the enormity of the cost which would result from the use of a full
adversarial process for every alleged deprivation.163 Similarly, in
Mackey v. Montrym,16 4 the Court upheld summary license suspen-
sions for individuals who refused to take breath-analysis tests. 1 65
The Court reasoned that, on balance, the deprivation of a driver's
license without a full factual finding and adversarial hearing was
justified by the state's extraordinary interest in protecting the pub-
157. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(11) (1994) ("Upon application, notice to all parties,
and hearing, the court may modify the terms of an existing order for protection.").
158. This is similar to other cases in which post-deprivation procedures allow for
rectifying an erroneous deprivation. See, e.g., Mathews, 424 U.S. 319 (allowing the
respondent six months following the deprivation to levy and prove a claim of errone-
ous deprivation).
159. Baker did not address the validity of the mechanisms of service, therefore,
for the purposes of this analysis, they will be presumed valid.
160. See, e.g., Nashaar v. Nashaar, 529 N.W.2d 13, 14 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (rec-
ognizing that ' i]n this era of crowded court calendars and limited judicial resources,
the requirement for expedited hearings in domestic abuse proceedings can be
burdensome").
161. 443 U.S. 282 (1979).
162. Id. at 284.
163. Id. See generally Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (holding the Social
Security Act's requirement that illegitimate children produce a higher burden of
proof than their legitimate counterparts to qualify for their deceased parents' Social
Security benefits is valid); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) (holding the du-
ration of relationship requirements of the Social Security Act valid).
164. 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
165. Id. at 18-19.
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lic from drunk drivers and its need to conserve administrative re-
sources. 166 Although the threat of suspension offered little added
deterrence value, it served the equally important purpose of show-
ing that the state was serious about addressing the problem of
drunk driving.167
The holdings of Califano and Mackey support the strength of
Minnesota's interest in preventing domestic violence and justify
evicting a respondent from a shared domicile for several reasons.
First, the state has an extraordinary interest in a violence-free soci-
ety.' 68 Second, the state acknowledges the need and importance of
conserving limited judicial resources.16 9 Finally, as in Mackey, the
state's victim-responsive policy serves the important purpose of
demonstrating that the state is serious about addressing the prob-
lem of domestic violence.170
Furthermore, the notice provides an alleged abuser meaning-
ful and sufficient time to prepare and proffer a reply to the allega-
tions levied against him. In Andrasko v. Andrasko,171 the
Minnesota Court of Appeals implicitly affirmed the validity of the
minimum five-day notice outlined in the Domestic Abuse Act.172
Andrasko involved a domestic abuse protection order temporarily
denying the respondent child custody, a deprivation arguably more
severe than eviction.173 Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that in a
situation of domestic violence, notice of one's right to a hearing will
be prima facie constitutional where it provides at least five days to
prepare a defense.174 In addition, the respondent's ability to con-
166. Id. at 19.
167. See Mackey, 443 U.S. at 17-18 (defining the preservation of public safety as
"paramount" and discussing the "great leeway" accorded states in adopting summary
procedures to protect public health and safety); see also Quinn, supra note 8, at 868.
168. Baker, 494 N.W.2d at 288.
169. See Nashaar, 529 N.W.2d at 14.
170. But see infra notes 211-18 and accompanying text (asserting that the justice
system, in reality, is not all that serious about responding to domestic violence).
171. 443 N.W.2d 228 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
172. Id. at 230 (finding an abuse of discretion where the district court failed to
grant a continuance to a respondent who received less than the five-day minimum
notice provided in MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(5)(a)).
173. The loss of custody is arguably a more serious deprivation than eviction. See
generally May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953) (asserting that the interest in
one's family is "far more precious than ... property rights"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (recognizing that the right to conceive and raise one's children
has been deemed "essential"). Child custody was also one of the main issues the
Baker court addressed. Baker, 494 N.W.2d at 282.
174. But see MODEL CODE, supra note 103, § 307 (recommending a 30-day window
for respondent-requested hearings as a way to afford due process and give adequate
time for the preparation of a defense); OR. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 107.7186(a) (But-
terworth Supp. II 1994) (allowing respondents precisely this 30-day response time);
see also Lerman, supra note 71, at 94 (recommending 20 days for respondent to re-
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test an order even after it becomes "final" serves to further mini-
mize the risk of erroneous deprivation, and provides respondent
with options for protecting his interests. 175 Thus, under Mathews,
the self-finalizing ex parte protection order created by Chapter 142
should be constitutional.
Moreover, under Fuentes, ex parte relief in situations of imme-
diate and threatened violence continues to be a response to an "ex-
traordinary circumstance" as it was in Baker. 176 The changes to ex
parte protection orders brought about by Chapter 142 did not affect
the circumstances of immediate and threatened domestic violence,
which remain emergency situations requiring prompt judicial ac-
tion. Finally, the statute's terms are narrow enough to sufficiently
limit the state's power to deprive the individual.
In addition, the resulting deprivation to the alleged abuser is
based on an adequate standard of proof. Ex parte protection orders
issued in situations of immediate and threatened violence need only
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence in Minnesota.177 In
quest a hearing where a second, final hearing is optional); ARiz. RIEv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-3602(d), (h) (Supp. 1995) (leaving the need for a hearing to the judge's discre-
tion, providing an unlimited time for respondent to request a hearing, and granting
each party one hearing as a matter of right during the life of the order).
175. See, e.g., Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 14 (1979) ("[Wlhen prompt
postdeprivation review is available for the correction of administrative error, we
have generally required no more than that the predeprivation procedures... provide
a reasonably reliable basis for concluding that the facts justifying the official action
are as a responsible governmental official warrants them to be."). But see Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972) (citing Sniadich v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay
View, 395 U.S 337 (1969)) (This court has not... embraced the general proposition
that a wrong may be done if it can be undone.").
176. See Baker, 494 N.W.2d at 289.
177. Given that ex parte protection orders are civil, not criminal orders, abuse
need only be shown by a preponderance of the evidence and not the stricter criminal
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. Marquette v. Marquette, 686 P.2d 990
(Okla. Ct. App. 1984). In recognition of respondents' interest, a few states employ an
elevated, clear and convincing evidentiary standard for ex parte relief. Quinn, supra
note 8, at 849. However, such an elevated standard is inadvisable and unnecessary,
because it would subvert the intention of the law and deny relief in many of the cases
for which ex parte provisions are intended. Lerman, supra note 71, at 92 n.88.
Moreover, by limiting the evidence that can be considered in making this determina-
tion, Minnesota courts may make the standard a more difficult one to meet.
For example, in some states, past instances of abuse can be considered as suffi-
cient to show the likelihood and threat of future abuse. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 107.718(2) (Buttworth 1994). In Minnesota, however, past abuse is insuffi-
cient to show present or future danger to petitioner. See Andrasko v. Andrasko, 443
N.W.2d 228, 230 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (invalidating a domestic abuse protection
order as improperly issued because, despite the allegation of specific incidents of
past abuse, there was no evidence of any intent to do present harm or a showing of
present harm as required by the statute); Bjergum v. Bjergum, 392 N.W.2d 604, 605
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the evidence, including unsubstantiated allega-
tions of abuse, was insufficient to warrant issuing a domestic abuse protection or-
der). Thus, relative to other states that also employ a preponderance of the evidence
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Metchel v. Metchel,178 the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that is-
suing an ex parte protection order is, in effect, a probable cause
finding of domestic abuse. 179 In terms of the quantum of evidence,
probable cause and preponderance of the evidence are roughly
equivalent.180 Given the urgency of the circumstances, the state's
strong interest in stopping domestic violence, and the batterer's
ability to vacate wrongful orders at any time, it is reasonable to
conclude an initial finding of domestic abuse will justify the eviction
of a respondent from the home for up to a year. 8 1
IV. Other Considerations-Effectiveness, Enforceability
and the Impact of Self-Finalizing Ex Parte
Protection Orders on Women as Victim/
Survivors
Establishing the constitutionality of the revised ex parte pro-
tection order only shows that the self-finalizing ex parte order cre-
ated by Chapter 142 may be considered legally credible. Still to be
addressed, however, is whether the revised ex parte order will be
credible in practice. In other words, will judges be likely to imple-
ment the revised ex parte protection orders fairly, will police en-
force them appropriately, and will women, as victim/survivors,
benefit from them sufficiently?
A. Implementation Issues: The Judiciary
Separation from an abuser marks the height of danger for a
victim.182 It is the time when she most needs legal assistance, and
also the most devastating time should the judicial system fail to
standard, Minnesota has, in reality, a slightly more stringent evidentiary standard
for issuing domestic abuse ex parte protection relief.
178. 528 N.W.2d 916 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
179. Id. at 918 (holding that the issuance of an ex parte protection order should be
treated as an implicit finding of probable cause of physical abuse in situations where
mediation is considered).
180. Preponderance of the evidence means "the existence of a contested fact is
more probable than its nonexistence." CHARLES MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON Evi-
DENCE § 339 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992). Similarly, probable cause requires
.only the probability, and not prima facie showing, of criminal activity .... " Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419
(1969)). Thus, both signify a standard of more likely than not.
181. One point not explored in this note is the nature of "temporary." One reason
for Oregon's success with a similar self-finalizing ex parte protection order may be
that the final remedy, involving deprivations of one year, is still considered tempo-
rary. Telephone Interview with Judith Armatta, supra note 68; see also OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 107.718 (Butterworth Supp. II 1994).
182. See Waits, supra note 7, at 283 (stating that a batterer usually becomes more
abusive if his partner makes any attempt to assert control over her life).
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protect her.183 At its best, going to court can be an empowering
experience whereby a victim sees justice can indeed prevail; 8 4
however, it can also be traumatic and difficult.185 The nature of the
experience depends largely on the attitude of the judge.'8 6
In the past, victims requesting temporary ex parte protection
orders typically met little resistance from the judiciary in obtaining
them.18 7 High issuance rates may be attributed to the limited na-
ture of the relief sought.1ss Temporary ex parte orders provide im-
mediate, short-term protection that lapses if not renewed.189 As a
result, little political risk exists for a judge who issues orders for all
credible requests. Moreover, the mandatory hearing necessary to
finalize the order minimizes the risk of erroneous deprivation. Af-
ter Chapter 142, however, the initial order is likely to become the
final order for protection.190 In anticipation of an enhanced risk of
183. See Truss, supra note 85, at 1172-73 ("The most violent and deadly attacks
often occur when abused women attempt to leave their abusers."); see also Waits,
supra note 7, at 271 (commenting that although "[tihe law is not a panacea for do-
mestic violence ... [Ut does not mean it can or should do nothing").
184. Molly Chaudhuri & Kathleen Daly, Do Restraining Orders Ielp? Battered
Women's Experience with Male Violence and Legal Process, in DomES'tiC VIOLENCE:
Tim CHANGING CmeINAL JUSTIcB REsPoNSE, supra note 1, at 243. "For most women
their experience with the legal process... was positive and empowering." Id. One
important factor is "the possibility that a woman's attorney can deliver 'some justice'
when cross-examining the assailant." Id. at 244. For some women, therefore, the
measure ofjustice is when "the man admit[s] his violence, 'the worst things... every
bit,' in the legal setting. This can be every bit as important to a woman as police
protection." Id.
185. See id. at 243-44 (noting that battered women, like rape victims, often suffer
a "second assault" by the legal system). Admittedly, there are emotional costs for
some women associated with telling their stories of abuse in public. Id. at 244.
Some are embarrassed by having to expose details of their personal life and abuses.
Id. Some feel invaded by the hearing. Id. Others welcome the chance to tell their
story, but prefer that the hearing take place in a judge's chambers. Id.
186. See id. When judges take a victim's complaint seriously, the victim is more
likely to feel supported and respected by the system. As one victim remarked:
The judge seemed to understand my situation. He... never doubted
my statements... [and] wanted me to know how important it was that
I hold up my end of the deal with the TRO to make it work .... I
assured him... I wouldn't blow it, he told me he admired my courage.
Id.
187. See, e.g., Salzman, supra note 43, at 337 (discussing the "high percentage of
restraining orders granted"). According to one study, "Ninety-one percent of Massa-
chusetts judges reported that they always issue a restraining order when there is a
serious threat of physical or mental harm to a victim." Id. at 337 n.46. Discrepancy
exists, however, as to whether the high issuance rate is attributable to a shift in
judges' attitudes or to judges' fear of public criticism. Id.
188. See supra notes 18-32 and accompanying text (defining temporary ex parte
protection orders generally and in Minnesota).
189. See, e.g., supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text (laying out the character-
istics of Minnesota's pre-Chapter 142 temporary ex parte relief).
190. See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text (explaining how ex parte pro-
tection orders work after Chapter 142's passage).
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erroneous deprivation, it is reasonable to conjecture that judges will
scrutinize protection order requests more diligently before issuing
ex parte orders.191
Lost along with the mandatory hearing is the opportunity for
a judge to publicly confront an abuser. The importance of this op-
portunity both to empower the victim1 92 and deter the abuser from
engaging in future violence should not be underestimated.193 Fore-
going this opportunity means that a batterer may not be made pub-
licly accountable for his abusive conduct until the police are called
to enforce a violated order. This does a great disservice to a victim
because it sends a message that the justice system will hold her
batterer publicly accountable only after she has been abused
again.1 94 Moreover, it erroneously relies on the willingness of law
enforcement personnel to effectively enforce a violated protection
order.
B. Enforcement Issues
1. Law Enforcement Officials
Protection orders are riddled with problems that can render
them ineffective and even dangerous. Orders for protection are
prone to violation, rarely produce arrests, and usually fail to pre-
vent future violence.1 95 Although abusers who want to harm their
191. This is reasonable because not only is the respondent deprived for a poten-
tially longer period of time under the revised ex parte order, but more petitioners
with "improper purpose" may seek the more accessible self-finalizing orders. One
possible unintended effect, therefore, is that judges will issue relatively fewer ex
parte protection orders. As before, however, the respondent is still free to move to
vacate the order. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., Dowd, supra note 89, at 31 (asserting that '[i]f the prosecutor and
judge fail to accompany arrest with a strong message of support for the victim, the
arrest will have little [impact]); see also Taub, supra note 89, at 331 (acknowledging
the "symbolic value" of a serious response by the justice system as a factor enabling
women to extricate themselves from abusive relationships).
193. See Lerman, supra note 71, at 97 ("[Slometimes the victim knows that the
abuser will not obey the order unless he is told in person by a judge that he must do
so."); see also Pamela Hill Nettleton, The First Question is to Ask Why Men Hit, STAR
TRm. (Minneapolis), Mar. 29, 1995, at A4 (observing that "[hie only stopped because
the judge told him next time he would go to jail"); Waits, supra note 7, at 278 (not-
ing the legal system's "important role in confronting and motivating batterers" be-
cause batterers "will change, if at all, only if they are forced to face the consequences
of what they have done").
194. Cf. Waits, supra note 7, at 303 ("The legal system must do everything it can
to encourage the victim to say 'no' to further abuse... [including] supportfing] her in
every act that reduces her isolation and promotes her safety.").
195. Developments, supra note 3, at 1510; see also Kinports & Fischer, supra note
8, at 220 (noting that less than six percent of domestic abuse service providers sur-
veyed described their county's enforcement procedures as working very well, while
almost half said procedures are poor or very poor).
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victims will clearly not be stopped by a piece of paper, inadequate
police responses to calls for assistance only reinforce petitioners' ex-
posure to violence.196 Moreover, an officer's unwillingness to arrest
may foster a victim's expectation that the justice system simply
does not care to help her.19 7
Police called to the scene of a violation do not arrest for a
number of reasons. First, even where authorized to make warrant-
less arrests whenever probable cause exists, many officers only
arrest when a violation was committed in their presence. 198 Sec-
ond, some officers will not arrest unless the violation itself consti-
tutes a separate offense, such as battery.199 Third, police may
refuse to enforce an order for protection when they believe the vic-
tim also "broke the order" by having voluntary contact with the
abuser.20 0 Fourth, many officers will identify with the abuser, not
the victim. 2 01 Finally, police often make no further effort to find an
abuser who fled the scene prior to their arrival.20 2 The variable
nature and ambiguity inherent in the revised ex parte order may
further compound these problems by confusing or frustrating of-
ficers.203 Thus, instead of fulfilling their obligation to help women
victimized by abuse, law enforcement officers may send victimized
196. See, e.g., Anthony Bouza, Responding to Domestic Violence, in WoMAN BAT-
TERING: PoLcY RESPONSES, supra note 5, at 191 (explaining that domestic abuse
"begins with angry words, then maybe a shove or a slap... [and ifl not treated at
this crucial juncture, it escalates, frequently culminating in murder"). See infra
notes 216-20 and accompanying text (introducing the idea of domestic violence as a
tool for the subordination of women).
197. See Dowd, supra note 89, at 31; see also Waits, supra note 7, at 309 ([A]rrest
is a strong signal of support to the victim.").
198. Kinports & Fischer, supra note 8, at 224 (reporting trends and statistics
emerging from a national survey of domestic violence advocacy services); see also
FINN & COLSON, supra note 18, at 54-55 (reporting that most states permit or re-
quire a warrantless arrest whenever an officer has probable cause to believe a pro-
tection order was violated or domestic abuse occurred).
199. Kinports & Fischer, supra note 8, at 225 (noting that approximately 18 per-
cent of respondents indicate the unwillingness to arrest for an order violation alone
is a problem despite the fact that most states make an order violation itself a misde-
meanor or criminal contempt).
200. Id. (stating that more than 88% of those surveyed indicated that officer un-
willingness to arrest because of voluntary victim contact is a problem in their com-
munities, and more than half (56%) considered it a very serious or significant
problem). The survey responses noted that police sometimes chastise the woman
and have even gone as far as arresting her for having voluntary contact with her
abuser. Id. at 225 n.256.
201. Waits, supra note 7, at 314 (asserting that because police forces are primar-
ily male, as are most batterers, officers will find it harder to identify with the victim).
202. Kinports & Fischer, supra note 8, at 226-27 (indicating that 44% of survey
responses report that no effort is taken to find an abuser who has fled, and some add
that police have even refused to file charges in such cases).
203. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text (discussing the inherent ambi-
guity of new orders).
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women a clear message that they will need to look elsewhere for
support.
2. Service of Notice
A petitioning victim's low expectations of police assistance
may begin even earlier because the first opportunity to "enforce" an
order for protection is the initial service on the abuser.20 4 Although
service of notice is an opportunity to show the justice system's sup-
port for a victim, it can become a frustrating experience of "inordi-
nate delays" that jeopardize her safety.205 Compounding the
problem is the fact that the revised ex parte protection order may
be served by publication or mail. 20 6 Pressure to use simpler, alter-
native methods may mount if, as is hoped, Chapter 142 encourages
more women to seek ex parte relief.20 7 Given sheer volume, over-
worked law enforcement personnel may have little incentive to dog-
gedly locate and personally serve a batterer.
Personal service, however, is undoubtedly the most desirable
service method for several reasons. It conveys a far more persua-
sive and concrete message that an abuser's conduct is intolerable.
It positively and unequivocally supports the victim-system alliance.
Most importantly, it confirms that the abuser indeed knows about
the order and its terms. 20 8 Such knowledge is important because
204. See Kinports & Fischer, supra note 8, at 221-22; cf. Waits, supra note 7, at
306 (arguing that "the legal system should constantly and consistently convey a
message that abuse is unacceptable conduct").
205. Kinports & Fischer, supra note 8, at 221 n.236 (noting that approximately
34% of those surveyed reported that service took three days or longer).
206. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text (explaining alternatives for
service).
207. Preliminary statistics from Ramsey County seem to indicate Chapter 142's
self-finalizing ex parte relief is a success. Telephone Interview with Nancy Libman,
Supervisor, Ramsey County Domestic Abuse Intake and Harassment Office (Mar. 1,
1996). Comparing 1994 and 1995 figures reveals that the total number of protection
orders issued jumped by approximately one-third. Id.; Statistics from Ramsey
County Domestic Abuse Intake and Harassment Office (Mar. 1, 1996) (on file with
author). This figure would seem to initially affirm advocates' hopes for increased
victim access to protection order relief. See supra notes 69-86 and text (discussing
advocates' hopes and concerns for Chapter 142).
It should be noted, however, that Ramsey County embraced the self-finalizing
order created by Chapter 142 and proactively implemented systems to enhance its
effectiveness. See Legal Services Memorandum, supra note 77, at 3. To its credit,
the Domestic Abuse Intake and Harassment Office developed a simplified applica-
tion, computerized tracking system, and reminder forms designed to help petitioners
through the process of requesting protection orders. Telephone Interview with
Nancy Libman, supra note 60. Id. To help it in its work, the Office created multi-
lingual instruction sheets which inform respondents of their rights and obligations
when served with an ex parte protection order. Id.
208. Telephone Interview with Judge Diana S. Eagon, supra note 61. One of the
statutory elements of a violation of an order for protection is that the defendant
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without it an abuser has a stronger basis for collaterally attacking
an alleged violation of the protection order.209 In addition, service
by mail or publication strengthens the assertion that ex parte pro-
tection orders are fundamentally unfair because the alleged abuser
may be deprived of rights without ever having been provided actual
notice. 2 10
Even when an arrest takes place, it will not affect a victim's
situation if the judicial system fails to reinforce the arrest with a
"strong message of support for the victim."2 11 Unfortunately, at
times the judiciary is unable or unwilling to fully prosecute protec-
tion order violations.2 12 While courts are more responsive to vic-
tims' needs than ever, some judges still demonstrate a dangerous
lack of understanding of domestic violence.2 13 In extreme cases,
judges have even engaged in inappropriate jokes, commentary, or
reproach of victims. 2 14 Such abdication of the judicial and law en-
"knows of the order." MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(14)(a) (West 1994); see, e.g., State v.
Dumas, No. CX-93-1608, 1994 WL 71403, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 1994) (ex-
plaining that the knowledge requirement is distinct from actual personal service be-
cause it mandates only that the respondent knows of the order); see also Engstrom v.
Farmers & Bankers Life Ins. Co., 41 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Minn. 1950) (defining waiver
as the relinquishment of a known right and both intent and knowledge are essential
elements); Blaeser and Johnson, P.A. v. Kjellberg, 483 N.W.2d 98, 102 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992) (holding that a defendant waived his right to later claim insufficiency of
process where the defendant received a summons and complaint by certified mail,
personally signed the return receipt and communicated with the plaintiff regarding
the filing of an answer in a breach of contract suit).
209. Dumas, 1994 WL 71403, at *2; see, e.g., State v. Redalen, No. C9-94-945,
1994 WL 714348, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (invalidating an alleged abuser's chal-
lenge based on his assertion that he lacked the requisite knowledge of the protection
order's existence). The Minnesota Court of Appeals noted that "[t]he statute's re-
quirement that the defendant 'knows of the order' is not a requirement of formal
notice, only a state-of-mind requirement." Id. at *2. Cf State v. Cook, 148 N.W.2d
368, 369-70 (Minn. 1967) (noting that failure to appeal a court order precludes a
collateral attack in a subsequent prosecution for violating the order); see also
Rigwald v. Rigwald, 423 N.W.2d 701, 705 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (establishing that a
final protection order is appealable in a special proceeding).
210. Actual personal service, however, is not a requirement for a criminal viola-
tion of an ex parte protection order. See supra notes 206-07.
211. Dowd, supra note 89, at 31.
212. See Waits, supra note 7, at 321-24 (discussing the difficulties prosecutors
face).
213. Truss, supra note 85, at 1164; see also Salzman, supra note 43, at 353-56
(noting that judicial insensitivity presented the "most significant obstacle" to the
program's success); BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FAMILY
VIOLENCE: INTERVENTIONS FOR THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (1993) (citing the failure ofju-
dicial officials to recognize the unique nature of the "victim-offender relationship and
other family dynamics").
214. See, e.g., Truss, supra note 85, at 1164-65 (citing a recent "stark example" of
an inappropriate joke that was circulated at the November 1994 State Bar of Texas
directors meeting); Mark Ballard, Edinburg Judge Awash in Criticisms, TEx. LAw.,
Feb. 17, 1992, at 8 (discussing a judge who, after denying a victim's protective order
request, said "[ilf he hits her again.., she can always file assault charges, and if he
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forcement functions shakes a victim's confidence in the justice sys-
tem, reinforces an abuser's control, and may even cause an abuser
to think his behavior is above, or worse yet, endorsed by the law. 215
C. The Benefits and Costs to Women as Victim/Survivors
Our justice system's historical unwillingness to implement
and enforce domestic violence laws demonstrates, in word and deed,
the reality that women are still subordinate in our society. It has
been said that the common law "rule of thumb" sanctioning male
violence against women 21 6 is not really dead, but only transformed
into its modern and more insidious manifestation: the idea that do-
mestic violence is not a serious matter.21 7 In one light, therefore,
domestic violence can be seen as the age-old product of society's ac-
ceptance of, and reverence for, male authority.218
hits her hard enough she can file aggravated assault [aind if he kills her, you can put
him away for murder"); Salzman, supra note 43, at 337 nn.42-44 (discussing a "clas-
sic case" in which a judge "admonished [a victim] for requesting legal intervention
and squandering judicial time and resources"-the victim received a protection or-
der and was later murdered by her abuser).
215. Truss, supra note 85, at 1198-99. Women's and advocates' frustrations with
inadequate protection are evidenced by the rising use of civil suits as a way to hold
the criminal justice system accountable for its failure to adequately protect abuse
victims. Id. at 1162. See also Merle H. Weiner, Domestic Violence and the Per Se
Standard of Outrage, 54 MD. L. REv. 183 (1995) (outlining tort and other alternative
legal remedies).
216. Truss, supra note 85, at 1157-60 (asserting that our society has not com-
pletely rejected the idea that intimate abuse by a husband toward his wife is a fun-
damentally private concern). The infamous "rule of thumb" permitted a man to beat
his wife with a rod or stick as long as the weapon used was "no larger than a man's
thumb" or, more perversely, "small enough to 'pass through a wedding band.'" Id. at
1157. The rule was denounced by early American courts as barbaric. Id. at 1158.
217. Id. at 1160; see also Waits, supra note 7, at 298-99, 304 (noting that in any
other context the same violence would swiftly be met with retaliation and calling for
the law to take the burden of prosecution entirely off of the victim). Sadly, the dan-
ger of law enforcement and judicial officials not taking allegations of domestic vio-
lence seriously already occurs. See, e.g., Hynson v. City of Chester, 864 F.2d 1026,
1028 (3d. Cir. 1988) (addressing law enforcement officers' failure to arrest an abuser
who killed his victim only 20 hours after police responded to her call for help); see
also Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990,
83 J. CraM. L. & CRimiNOLOGY 46, 47 (1992) (arguing that police attitudes demon-
strate that domestic violence is not a serious matter and, therefore, does not merit
police concern).
218. See Waits, supra note 7, at 269 ("[Plowerful social forces permit and even
encourage abuse."). Judge William Sweeney of Minnesota has stated that battering
is directly associated with sexism. Address to Minnesota Conference on Criminal
Justice Policies in Domestic Violence Cases, quoted in Ellen Pence, The Duluth Do-
mestic Abuse Intervention Project, 6 HAMrNE L. REV. 247, 251-52 (1983). When
asked, "Why do we have so many victims of battering?" he responded, "This society,
historically, presumes male superiority: If you grant this presumption, that superi-
ority has to be validated if challenged. How does one validate it? Ultimately by
physical force." Id. See also Murray A. Straus, A Sociological Perspective on the
Prevention and Treatment of Wifebeating, in BArERED WOMEN: A PSYCHOSOCo-
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Failing to implement laws when a woman/victim most needs
them not only reinforces her inferior status, but also sustains a "veil
of normalcy" for the violence against her.219 Moreover, the courts'
failure to use available sanctions when women stand up for them-
selves in situations of violence can only undermine women's confi-
dence that the system truly desires them to be strong and
independent.220 Generally, society is uncomfortable with having
strong women as members. 2 2 1 This discomfort is evident in the dis-
parate way we, through our justice system, treat assertive, self-in-
terested women. 2 22
Ironically, as both a side effect of and a tactic for combatting
domestic violence, abused women and their advocates have come
perilously close to embracing the very stereotypes that disadvan-
tage women. For example, Battered Woman Syndrome, recognized
as the best explanation of "why women stay," feeds into and gives
credence to the idea that women are weak (at least from a tradition-
ally male perspective).2 2 3
LOGICAL STUDY OF DoMEsTIc VIOLENCE 194, 208-17 (Maria Roy ed., 1977) (listing
nine sociological factors that encourage abuse of women); Donald G. Dutton et al.,
Arrest and the Reduction of Repeat Wife Assault, in DoMESTic VIOLENCE: THE
CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE, supra note 1, at 111-13 (contending that
men who repeatedly abuse their wives do so because aggression serves an expressive
and cathartic function, establishes dominance roles in a relationship, resolves the
conflict at hand, and is rewarding-all of which make the behavior likely to be re-
peated); D.J. Tice, Modern Society Hasn't Shown Much Progress in Taming Male
Aggression, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 16, 1995, at A10 (asserting that Minne-
sota's 1995 record homicide rate and the domestic abuse epidemic stem from soci-
ety's inability to adequately deal with the uniquely "male problem" of aggression).
219. Truss, supra note 85, at 1166. The fact is that men who abuse women come
in all shapes, sizes, and socio-economic classes. Society's sanctioning of violence just
because it occurs in the home allows abusers to "conceal the darker side of their
personality" under a "veil of normalcy." Id. at 1166-67.
220. Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 3, at ix (reporting on the feminist movement's
finding that the criminal justice establishment consists of "male-dominated
paramilitary command structures" whose "prime implicit tenet has been to reinforce
the patriarchal hierarchy of Western society, even to the extent of tacitly condoning,
by inaction, violence that effectively 'puts women in their place' ").
221. Katherine Dunn, Just as Fierce: Men and Women, MOTHER JONES, Nov.-Dec.
1994, at 34, 34. "American women have proven their efficacy in every law enforce-
ment agency.., the idea that women can't take care of themselves still permeates
our culture." Id. at 36. The author goes on to argue that women's aggression is not
taken seriously and, instead of being seen as dangerous, is only viewed as "cute" or
self defense." Id. at 39.
222. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 12, at 66-67 (1993) (highlighting a jury's
unwillingness to indict an alleged rapist because the victim had asked her armed
assailant to use a condom); see also Dowd, supra note 89, at 45-46 (discussing the
"good battered woman" stereotype and its effect on the legal system's treatment of
women).
223. Naomi Cahn & Joan Meier, Domestic Violence and Feminist Jurisprudence:
Towards a New Agenda, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 339, 353-54 (1995). "The stereotype of
battered women as dysfunctional, passive, and weak has emerged in part from the
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Admittedly, Battered Woman Syndrome and its companion
concept of "learned helplessness" raised public consciousness and
garnered support for addressing the problems of domestic abuse;
however, it is this very stereotype of women as the weaker sex that
has traditionally held women back.224 It is bitterly ironic, there-
fore, that at a time when women work shoulder to shoulder with
men in more fields than ever, they find their most credible legal
options22 5 require the invocation of traditional stereotypes of de-
pendency and weakness that ultimately disadvantage women. 22 6
The substantive remedy of Chapter 142 and the process by which
the amendment was adopted are particularly troublesome because
they presuppose and perpetuate the idea that women are weak.
Thus, although Chapter 142 seems beneficial on its face, the
amendment exacts a costly hidden price from abused women.
The amended ex parte protection order seems beneficial be-
cause it leaves the decision of whether to have a final hearing
largely up to the victim. 22 7 "Victim control" is a crucial and well-
clinical concept of the 'battered woman syndrome.'" Id. at 353. At least this is how
our male-dominated societal structures, which tend to view power as "either/or"
seem to define women. Admittedly legal feminists have a very different perspective.
Because they recognize differences in women's experiences, legal feminists tend not
to see weakness as inherent in Battered Woman Syndrome. Moreover, they revolt
against the idea of women as homogenous' and easily categorized, instead calling for
systems to recognize women's world view as distinct from men's. See Christine A.
Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives on Male
Battering of Women, 1 U. Ci. LEGAL F. 23 (1989); see also Dunn, supra note 221, at
39 ("It is time to recognize the variability of females, just as we do males.").
224. Women's physical or emotional inferiority to men has always been a justifica-
tion for keeping them out of male-dominated employment and societal positions. See
Dunn, supra note 221, at 36, 39 (noting that "the mythology of females as essentially
non-violent" embodies a dangerous message: women can still get hurt, but they are
not allowed to fight back). See also Developments, supra note 3, at 1503 (acknowl-
edging the cultural perceptions of weakness and dysfunctionality which abuse vic-
tims must overcome in child custody proceedings).
225. See Weiner, supra note 215, at 241 (conceding that under current law, wo-
men's best chance for proceeding successfully in tort may require employing tradi-
tional female stereotypes of "dependency and helplessness"). Notably, women's
"weakness" seems to be the only justification of why women stay that courts and
society will accept as credible. Again, this supports the idea that society is uncom-
fortable with strong women.
226. See Dunn, supra note 221, at 38. Dunn observes:
[Ilt is still popular to assert that all female criminals are driven by male
threat or patriarchical pressure. (The characters of Thelma & Louise'
... are good examples of this stereotype.) Although on the surface this
presumption of female innocence corrupted by male aggression seems
complimentary, in fact it is deeply patronizing..".. [A] failure to ac-
knowledge the bad that women can do is a failure to take women
seriously.
Id.
227. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (discussing the revised process
for obtaining a hearing)
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established principle in effective advocacy.2 28 This purported bene-
fit, however, is hollow for two reasons. First, it seems unlikely that
victims, when given a choice, will opt for the discomfort, fear, and
inconvenience associated with a full court hearing, even where such
hearings may be in their best interest. This is especially true when
the same result (a valid protection order) can be obtained without a
hearing. Thus, while victim/survivors may save themselves the dif-
ficulty of facing their batterer or telling their story in court, they
sacrifice an opportunity, albeit bittersweet, for empowerment. 22 9
Second, women can only hold the judicial system accountable for its
inadequacies when such problems are exposed. Exposure, however,
only comes from experience. By opting not to be a presence in the
courts, women risk losing the ability to expose mistreatment and
demand change.
Another apparent benefit of the amended ex parte protection
order which is troublesome on examination is that women who
otherwise might not seek protection orders will be encouraged to
use them. 230 The problem is that without addressing existing en-
forcement problems, any gains in access will likely be short
lived.231 Increasing the volume of ex parte protection orders issued
without also attempting to remedy existing enforcement problems
can only exacerbate the obstacles to enforcement, 232 thereby frus-
trating all parties and fostering the perception that a protection or-
der is just a worthless piece of paper.
Finally, because uncooperative abusers will not be hauled into
court to account publicly for their behavior,233 batterers can con-
tinue denying (at least to themselves) the impropriety of their ac-
tions.23 4 Where no hearing occurs, the only manifestation of
228. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (discussing court as a potentially
empowering experience).
230. See supra note 74 (noting that protection orders are underutilized by women
of Southeast Asian decent). This is particularly important because the Minneapolis/
St. Paul metropolitan area has a sizable Southeast Asian population. See also supra
note 70 (discussing the benefits of discretionary hearings for some same-sex
petitioners).
231. See Taub, supra note 89, at 331 (discussing the need for society to put its
resources behind its prohibitions of battering as a way to help the victim and change
social attitudes).
232. This will surely overwhelm already frustrated officers. See supra notes 197-
215 and accompanying text (discussing obstacles to police enforcement).
233. See supra note 192-94 and accompanying text.
234. See Waits, supra note 7, at 278 ("'he necessity of intervention arises from
the batterer's refusal to accept responsibility for his actions."). Indeed as the author
notes:
Denial and minimization are crucial defense mechanisms for the bat-
terer, because they allow him to evade accountability for his actions.
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society's outrage at a respondent's conduct will be the order itself.
An order is all too often seen by a batterer as a meaningless piece of
paper.235 This detrimental perception is supported when the offi-
cial "paper" is not personally served by a legal representative. In-
stead, the order may arrive as would any piece of unwanted mail-
an act that speaks volumes to the half-heartedness with which soci-
ety condemns a batterer's violent conduct.
As a process, Chapter 142 is in some respects an example of
how not to legislate on behalf of domestic violence victims. In addi-
tion to being developed as a "one size fits all" reform, 36 the amend-
ment may have tried to do too much. Chapter 142 was as much or
more a solution to the problem of crowded court dockets as it was a
scheme to assist domestic violence victims.237 Self-finalizing ex
parte orders were simply not a priority on the agenda of domestic
violence advocates.238 Dialogue between lawmakers and victims'
advocates at all stages of policymaking is crucial for passing mean-
ingful and effective legislation; without it even the best of inten-
tions can fall flat, or worse, be counterproductive to the work of the
advocacy community. Despite the advocates' recognized value to
the lawmaking process,2 39 however, they were not fully consulted
before Chapter 142 was introduced.2 40 Such disconnected lawmak-
By refusing to believe that any problem exists, he thus feels no need to
change. Even when confronted with undeniable evidence of his vio-
lence, he will minimize its severity.
Id. at 289. See also Curt Brown & Selena Roberts, Warren Moon Hit and Choked
Her, Wife Felicia Says, STAR Tam. (Minneapolis), July 20, 1995, at Al (quoting Moon
as having said, "These are personal problems. It was not a case of domestic violence.
It was a domestic dispute." Moon's statements came after he was arrested for chok-
ing his wife to the point of nearly passing out).
235. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (discussing protection orders'
"paper tiger" problem).
236. The tendency to assume that what is needed in one district will work in all
districts was a common criticism offered by the nearly one dozen advocates inter-
viewed. See, e.g., Legal Services Memorandum, supra note 77, at 3 (suggesting one
potential remedy for Chapter 142's pitfalls is to allow counties to adopt the option of
adopting the "no hearing system").
237. See supra notes 33-51 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text. At least these were not a pri-
ority in the Minneapolis/St. Paul metropolitan area. There may have been support
for the idea in Olmstead County. However, it appears there was no pre-introduction
support for the amendment anywhere else. Telephone Interview with Jody Tharp,
supra note 33.
239. See, e.g., Finn, supra note 25, at 178, 185 (discussing Duluth judges' close
coordination with the local advocacy community); see also Calm & Lerman, supra
note 7, at 102 ("It is well-established that the use of victim advocates as contact
points for abused women increases the rate of cooperation and increases the victims'
satisfaction with the justice system."); Quinn, supra note 8, at 340-41 (discussing the
importance of advocates and their role in assisting abuse victims).
240. See, e.g., supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text (noting that Chapter 142
was introduced late in the session and was not a priority on the advocates' agenda).
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ing has no place in the struggle against domestic violence; it is risky
and arguably patronizing. A swift and effective attack on domestic
violence, therefore, necessitates a unified effort between advocates
and lawmakers.
Chapter 142, therefore, is based on misguided perceptions and
priorities which put it substantively and procedurally off the mark
in effectively assisting domestic violence victims. For example, if
the problem is that a victim fears or is embarrassed about asking
her employer for time off to go to a hearing,241 the answer is not to
excuse her absence from court as a blanket policy. Although this
certainly solves the immediate problem, and may even be best in
some instances, 24 2 it also has the negative effect of both hindering
the woman from learning to assert her rights and keeping domestic
violence in the closet and out of the public eye.2 4 3 Instead, it is the
employer's attitude that should change. Legislators can assist by
working with abused women and their advocates to help make this
type of change happen.
V. Making Ex Parte Protection Orders Work
Ex parte protection orders offer an abuse victim the opportu-
nity to obtain the support of the justice system in making a break
from her abuser. This support, however, must be more than just a
piece of paper if the system is to follow through on its promise to
protect a woman who risks much, maybe even her life, in obtaining
a protection order. In the case of Minnesota's revised ex parte pro-
tection orders, there are five steps that could be taken to make or-
In fairness, it should be noted that Judge Ring did consult with the Rochester Wo-
men's Shelter. Telephone Interview with Judge Gerard Ring, supra note 31. Advo-
cates there were excited by the amendment. Id. However, as discussed, one policy
seldom fits all. What makes sense for an outstate area like Olmstead County simply
may not work for urban counties such as Hennepin or Ramsey. See supra note 236.
241. The problem of victims' shame and reluctance to let others in on their "dark
secret" is a recognized hindrance to victims' participation in the legal process. See
Chaudhuri & Daly, supra note 184, at 245 (naming job-related issues, and not legal
steps, as the greater obstacle to women seeking restraining orders). A problem fre-
quently mentioned by abused women was explaining their absence from work:
"[Wihat 'good story' would they give supervisors or co-workers?" Id. Moreover, evi-
dence suggests women's fear of stigma is well-founded because "employers view bat-
tered women as high risk-employees." Id.
242. There are certainly times when a petitioning victim should not be forced to
come to court. Obviously, a victim should not appear in court when doing so would
be dangerous for her or cause her serious hardship; however, such victim absence
from the courts should be the exception, not the rule.
243. See Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 3, at vii (concluding that the "'privacy'
accorded to the traditional patriarchal family unit was one of the key structural bar-
riers to the fulfillment of women's rights"). Admittedly, facing one's abuser is distin-
guishable because a victim's safety may be at issue. But the best solution still may
not include excusing a victim's presence from court.
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ders more credible and effective: (1) increase the length of time an
alleged batterer has to opt for a hearing; (2) strengthen personal
service of the order on the respondent; (3) improve victim access to
protection orders; (4) clarify statutory ambiguities; and (5) educate
justice system and law enforcement personnel.
First, increasing the length of time a batterer has to opt for a
hearing will help avoid potential due process problems. The Model
Code for Domestic and Family Violence calls for,244 and at least one
other state uses, a response window of thirty days.2 45 Giving an
alleged abuser more time to request a hearing should ameliorate
concerns regarding the adequacy of time provided for making an
informed waiver of his right to a hearing.246
Second, strengthening personal service on the alleged abuser
will help both to deter constitutional challenges and to increase the
overall efficacy of protection orders. Personal service should be
sought in all cases. 247 The server should explain the terms of the
order, leave a written summary of this explanation with the respon-
dent (preferably in the respondent's native language), and obtain
the respondent's signature on a second copy of the explanatory
form.248 This signed form thus constitutes proof of service and con-
firms that the respondent received notice of the protection order
and comprehended its terms. Ideally, these documents would be
added to the state's computerized records system;249 however, such
244. See supra notes 103, 174 and accompanying text (discussing the importance
of providing the respondent with adequate time to respond to service).
245. See, e.g., supra note 174 (referring to Oregon's 30-day response window and
highlighting Arizona's unlimited response window which lasts for the life of the
order).
246. See Lerman, supra note 71, at 95 (commenting that a more conservative stat-
utory approach to ex parte protection order relief is less likely to elicit a constitu-
tional challenge); see also notes 208-09 and accompanying text (explaining the
significance of knowledge and waiver).
247. See supra notes 204-10 (discussing issues supporting personal service of
notice).
248. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 107.178(4)(b) (Butterworth Supp. II 1994)
(requiring personal service either by a sheriff or, if the petitioner requests, a third
party). In addition, Oregon requires that the "return of service" (consisting of copies
of the affidavit of proof of service, petition, and protection order) be delivered to the
sheriff's office for entry onto Oregon's Law Enforcement Data System. Id.
§ 107.720(1).
Notably, Ramsey County's Domestic Abuse Intake and Harassment Office is
taking a number of these steps. Telephone Interview with Nancy Libman, supra
note 60; see supra note 207 (describing some of the steps taken by Ramsey County).
249. See OR. REv. STAT. AN. § 107.718(4)(b) (Butterworth Supp. II 1994) ("Entry
into the Law Enforcement Data System constitutes notice to all law enforcement
agencies of the existence of such order."); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 103,
§ 315, commentary at 32 (calling for the creation and use of a state 'registry" for
protection orders that would make order information available to courts and law
enforcement agencies "around the clock"). See generally Get Those Records in Shape,
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a system does not yet exist in Minnesota.250 Service by mail should
only be permitted in rare instances and only when receipt by the
respondent can be verified. Similarly, service by publication should
be permitted only in extreme cases.
Third, improving victim access to protection orders will help
provide relief to many women who otherwise might not seek such
orders. Often abuse victims do not obtain protection orders because
they are unaware of their options, unable to take the requisite pro-
cedural steps, or unsure of how the justice system will treat
them.251 However, a number of these access obstacles can be over-
come by educating the community about the availability of ex parte
relief, making ex parte protection orders available after business
hours and over the phone, eliminating all fees for protection orders,
and enhancing the role of advocates and clerks.
Educating the community about the existence of ex parte pro-
tection orders lets abused women know they have an option for
remedying their situations.25 2 Education efforts build awareness
by reaching and teaching the community through a variety of me-
dia and networking opportunities.25 3 Without such victim aware-
ness, even the most ideal system for obtaining protection order
relief will go under-utilized.
Making emergency ex parte protection orders available after
hours and by phone will eliminate judicial unavailability as an ob-
stacle to obtaining a protection order.254 Extending normal court
PORTLAND OR GONiAN, Feb. 15, 1994, at D8 (discussing a potential federal effort for
improving states' computer records systems, including Oregon's). Oregon's system
has been in existence since 1974 and currently contains criminal histories on
702,000 individuals and case outcomes for 75-80% of criminal cases. Id.
250. Minnesota has used databases in isolated instances including the tracking of
alleged gang members and sexual offenders, and is presently considering implement-
ing a large-scale database system. Telephone Interview with Loretta Frederick,
supra note 82; see also Legislative Briefing: Crime Prevention Committee Passes Ex-
panded Sex-Offender Registration Bill, STAR Tim. (Minneapolis), Apr. 13, 1993, at
B2 (announcing the expansion of a central database designed to notify authorities of
sex offenders in their areas); Ann O'Connor & Chris Graves, Gang Awareness Up,
But Actual Threat Low in Twin Cities, STAR Tim. (Minneapolis), Mar. 20, 1995, at
B1 (discussing Minneapolis' database containing 6,000 names of alleged gang mem-
bers and their associates).
251. See Kinports & Fischer, supra note 8, at 169-82 (examining the reasons why
women do not readily seek protection order relief); see also Chaudhuri & Daly, supra
note 184, at 235-45 (presenting victims' views on the potential benefits and limita-
tions of protection orders).
252. Kinports & Fischer, supra note 8, at 182.
253. The Ramsey County Domestic Abuse Intake and Harassment Office is ex-
ploring the production of a video explaining how to obtain protection order relief.
Telephone Interview with Nancy Libman, supra note 60. The office hopes to show
the video in its office and on cable television. Id.
254. Kinports & Fischer, supra note 8, at 185.
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hours in the morning or evening would minimize access problems
for victims who work or who must travel long distances to request a
protection order. Issuing protection orders by phone should help
alleviate such external pressures on a victim.
For example, the Model Code for Domestic and Family Vio-
lence recommends that courts always have a judicial official on duty
to issue oral emergency protection orders whenever a law enforce-
ment officer convincingly states by telephone that a petitioner is in
immediate danger of domestic violence.255 Using law enforcement
officers as judicial agents in this way creates twenty-four-hour ac-
cess to emergency protection orders.256 Telephone orders should
also lessen the strain on crowded court calendars,257 and may even
bring about positive "judicial attitudes and behavior" because
phone orders take up little of a judge's time.25 8
Eliminating all protection order fees will increase access by
ensuring that no victim is prevented from obtaining a protection
order because she lacks financial resources. 25 9 Although many
states permit fee waivers for indigent petitioners, 260 implementa-
tion problems mean it is unlikely waivers are granted in every ap-
propriate case.261 Even if these problems are remedied, and
waivers are granted to all eligible petitioners, protection orders
255. MODEL CODE, supra note 103, at § 305, commentary at 26. See, e.g., AIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3624(A) (Supp. 1995). The statute provides:
In counties with a population of one hundred fifty thousand persons or
more ... the presiding judge of the superior court, during the hours
that the courts are closed, shall make available on a rotating basis a
judge, justice of the peace, magistrate or commissioner who shall issue
emergency orders of protection by telephone.
Id.; see also OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 107.718(1) (Butterworth Supp. II 1994) ("When a
petitioner files a petition. .. the circuit court shall hold an ex parte hearing in per-
son or by telephone on the day the petition is filed or on the following judicial day.").
256. MODEL CODE, supra note 103, at § 305, commentary at 26.
257. Easing pressure on crowded court calendars was one of the original concerns
leading to the introduction and enactment of Chapter 142. See supra notes 33-51
and accompanying text.
258. Kinports & Fischer, supra note 8, at 185.
259. Id. at 186. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 107.71(4)(c) (Butterworth Supp.
II 1994) ("No filing fee, service fee or hearing fee shall be charged for proceedings
seeking only the relief provided under ORS 107.700 to 107.730.")
260. Kinports & Fischer, supra note 8, at 180-81; see, e.g., MmN. STAT.
§ 518B.01(4Xe) (1994) ("The court shall advise a petitioner ... of the right to a mo-
tion and affidavit and to sue in forma pauperis pursuant to section 563.01."); Id.
§ 563.01(c) (Supp. 1995) (permitting courts to waive civil action fees and costs for a
person who receives public assistance, who is represented by a legal services agency
as an indigent client, or whose annual income is less than 125% of the poverty line).
261. Kinports & Fischer, supra note 8, at 181. Judges are sometimes reluctant or
unwilling to grant fee waivers in appropriate cases. Id. Similarly, court clerks may
fail to inform petitioners that waivers are available, and may even discourage peti-
tioners from requesting a fee waiver. Id.
[Vol. 14:593
EX PARTE PROTECTION ORDERS
may remain unaffordable for women with minimal resources. 262
Moreover, waiving all fees would demonstrate that the justice sys-
tem is serious about ending domestic violence against all popula-
tions of women. 263
Enhancing the role of clerks and advocates will increase vic-
tim access to protection orders by helping more women successfully
complete the process of obtaining valid orders. Each family court
(or other appropriate court) should have at least one domestic vio-
lence advocate or clerk who is required to help victims complete
protection order petitions. These clerks should be given specialized
training.264 Clerks should also use simplified forms, written expla-
nations of procedures and requirements, and tracking systems that
will help them remind petitioners of important upcoming steps in
obtaining a valid order.265
Fourth, clarifying statutory ambiguities will help advocates
and victims more effectively use Chapter 142's amended ex parte
protection order relief. Because the scope of the relief authorized is
arguably unclear, Chapter 142 can be construed as limited to pro-
scribing violent acts and evicting the respondent from a shared
dwelling.266 The state's "petition for order" form mirrors this con-
fusing language.267 As a result, a number of advocates are report-
edly either whiting out the troublesome language, or requesting
hearings whenever more relief than a simple eviction is at issue.268
262. Id. at 181-82. Advocates report that it is not the women with the fewest
economic resources who face the greatest access problems, but rather women with
some economic resources. Id. at 182.
263. Id. at 186.
264. See Salzman, supra note 43, at 359 (asserting that training that teaches ad-
vocates and clerks to remain attentive to a victim's unique needs is necessary be-
cause advocates tend to recite directions that sometimes do not apply to an
individual's particular situation); see also Kinports & Fischer, supra note 8, at 184
(recommending that clerks also be educated about statutory requirements, the na-
ture of abusive relationships, and how to work with special-needs populations, in-
cluding illiterate and non-English speaking petitioners).
265. Ramsey County, the only Minnesota county that appears to be experiencing
success with the revised ex parte protection order, has a number of these systems in
place. See supra note 207 (discussing Ramsey County's apparent success with Chap-
ter 142 and some of the safeguards it has developed); see also Legal Services Memo-
randum, supra note 77, at 3 (noting that Ramsey County is "unique" because it has a
separate domestic abuse intake office and has developed procedural safeguards to
ensure petitioners stay informed of important developments). In addition, Ramsey
County is unusual because it has "probably spent more time on implementation than
other counties." Id.
266. See supra note 118 (discussing the language causing confusion about the
scope of relief under Chapter 142).
267. Telephone Interview with Jody Tharp, supra note 33; Telephone Interview
with Kim Clements, supra note 70.
268. Telephone Interview with Maria Pastoor, supra note 47; Telephone Inter-
view with Kim Clements, supra note 70. Some advocates and clerks are whiting out
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Clarifying this language would help victims and advocates more
confidently request ex parte protection relief. Another possible so-
lution would be to allow counties to "opt out" of using no-hearing,
self-finalizing ex parte protection orders.269 An optional policy
might help alleviate tensions some counties have demonstrated re-
garding the revised ex parte relie'7o and allow time to work the
"bugs" out of the amended statute.271
Fifth, educating justice system personnel is vital for modifying
judicial attitudes and behaviors.272 Law enforcement officers
should be informed of Chapter 142's revised ex parte protection or-
der, its effects, and their anticipated role in enforcing it. Officers
should also be trained in special techniques applicable to domestic
violence disputes.273 Educating our judicial and law enforcement
officers is indeed an important step; however, the actions and atti-
tudes of officers only mirror society's views of women and domestic
violence. Societal attitudes, therefore, must also change. This is a
huge undertaking that will require the collaboration of many-es-
pecially advocates and lawmakers. Only with such cooperation can
a sufficiently broad effort, one that condemns domestic violence
without resorting to the use of stereotypes about women, be carried
out.2 7 4
confusing language that seems to require a hearing where custody and visitation,
support, maintenance, temporary awards of property, and counseling are requested.
Id. See also supra note 118.
269. This optional policy was one idea suggested to Representative Bishop in Jan-
uary 1996. See Legal Services Memorandum, supra note 77, at 3. Allowing counties
to decide whether the self-finalizing orders would be workable in their districts
would resolve the inadequacies of a "one size fits all" reform. See supra note 236 and
accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 63, 94-96 and accompanying text (discussing Hennepin
County's refusal to implement Chapter 142).
271. See Legal Services Memorandum, supra note 77, at 3. A similar "opt out"
approach was evidently used when the administrative process for child support was
implemented. Id. The system "wasn't mandated statewide until all the bugs were
worked out." Id. Thus, implementation of Chapter 142's no-hearing, self-finalizing
relief also could remain discretionary "until some date a few years down the line
when it would become mandatory." Id. See also supra notes 63, 94-96 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Hennepin County's refusal to implement Chapter 142).
272. See Salzman, supra note 43, at 356. Comprehensive and ongoing training
programs for judges should inform them about the range of sanctions available and
the necessity for stringent measures in domestic violence cases. Id. Such training
should assist judges in "assessing a batterer's level of dangerousness and [in] setting
up a safety plan for the victim." Id. at 357.
273. See id. at 350-51 (providing examples and discussing the importance of spe-
cial techniques for gathering evidence and adequately responding to reports of do-
mestic abuse).
274. See ARTs ACTION AGAINsr DoMEsTic VIOLENCE, supra note 2. "Until domes-
tic violence is truly condemned by the community, batterers will continue their
abuse and victims will remain trapped in a potentially lethal cycle of violence." Id.
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Conclusion
Progressive reforms can be successful only if their design
takes into account existing obstructionist attitudes and operational
practices. If such factors are to be adequately considered, the rele-
vant players must work together closely in crafting new laws.
Although well-intentioned, Chapter 142 lacked such collaboration.
As a result, the self-finalizing ex parte protection order that
emerged from the legislative process is of limited value. But Chap-
ter 142's flaws are not necessarily fatal. It may be possible to re-
think and rework self-finalizing ex parte protection orders through
amendments. However, if these orders are to be credible tools that
have a meaningful place in the fight against domestic violence in
Minnesota, lawmakers will need to better collaborate with mem-
bers of the justice system, law enforcement, and advocacy commu-
nities from around the state.
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Appendix A
Domestic Abuse Act, ch. 142, MiNN. STAT. § 518B.01, sec. 5, § 7
(1995 Minn. Sess. Law) (additions are indicated by underlining; de-
letions by strikeouts). The pertinent segments of the session law
are as follows:
Subd. 7. TP vet" , Ex Parte Order. (a) Where an application
under this section alleges an immediate and present danger of do-
mestic abuse, the court may grant an ex parte temper order for
protection, pending a f-" ll har. -, and granting relief as the court
deems proper, including an order:
(1) restraining the abusing party from committing acts of do-
mestic abuse;
(2) excluding any party from the dwelling they share or from
the residence of the other except by further order of the court....
(b) A finding by the court that there is a basis for issuing an
ex parte temporary order for protection constitutes a finding that
sufficient reasons exist not to require notice under applicable court
rules governing applications for ex parte temporry relief.
(c) Subject to paragraph (d), an ex parte temporaey order for
protection shall be effective for a fixed period not to ...... 14 ays,
ex.ept for good ..... as ...vided unde paragraph (d) set by the
court, as provided in subdivision 6, paragraph (b), or until modified
or vacated by the court pursuant to a hearing. Upon request, a full
hearing, as provided by this section, shall be set for not later than
seven days from the issuance of the temporary ex parte order, if a
hearing is requested by the petitioner, or not later than ten days or
earlier than eight days from receipt by the court of a request for a
hearing by the respondent. Except as provided in paragraph (d),
the respondent shall be personally served forthwith a copy of the ex
parte order along with a copy of the petition, if requested by the
petitioner, and notice of the date set for the hearing. If the peti-
tioner does not request a hearing, an order served on a respondent
under this subdivision must include a notice advising the respon-
dent of the right to request a hearing, must be accompanied by a
form that can be used by the respondent to request a hearing and
must include a conspicuous notice that a hearing will not be held
unless requested by the respondent within five days of service of the
order.
(d) When Service is of the ex parte order may be made by pub-
lished notice, as provided under subdivision 5, the petitioner may
ap~ply for an exeso ofthe peie o f the ex. p~ orde. at the
same-time provided that the petitioner files the affidavit required
under that subdivision. The rt ma xtend the ex part.. te
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c -r fo. a. aditional p not to exeeed 14 days.. The
respondent shall be served forthwith a copy of the modified ex parte
order along with a copy of the notice of the new date set for the
hearing. If personal service is not made or the affidavit is not filed
within 14 days of issuance of the ex parte order, the order expires.
If the petitioner does not request a hearing, the petition mailed to
the respondent's residence, if known, must be accompanied by the
form for requesting a hearing and notice described in paragraph (c).
Unless personal service is completed, if service by published notice
is not completed within 28 days of issuance of the ex parte order,
the order expires.
(e) If the petitioner seeks relief under subdivision 6 other than
the relief described in paragraph (a), the petitioner must request a
hearing to obtain the additional relief.
(f) Nothing in this subdivision affects the right of a party to
seek modification of an order under subdivision 11.

